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THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SPEAK ABOUT THE HUMAN 
GENOME 
Barbara J. Evans∗ 
Today, we celebrate the revelation of the first draft of the human book of 
life.1 
Today, we are learning the language in which God created life.2 
INTRODUCTION 
The metaphor of the human genome as the Book of Life already 
was in wide use before June 26, 2000 when Dr. Francis Collins, Direc-
tor of the National Human Genome Research Institute, and Presi-
dent Bill Clinton spoke these words at a White House gathering to 
celebrate the Human Genome Project.  A search of the phrase “hu-
man genome book of life” in the National Library of Medicine’s 
PubMed database yields thirty-one hits in the peer-reviewed scientific 
literature,3 including an anthropological study of how the “Book of 
Life” metaphor evolved in the popular press between 1990 and 2002.4  
As sometimes happens in history, the revelation of a new sacred text 
devolved into spats about who is good enough to read it:  Specifically, 
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 1 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President, Prime Minister Tony 
Blair of England, Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute, 
and Dr. Craig Venter, President and Chief Scientific Officer, Celera Genomics Corporation, on the 
Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human Genome Project (June 26, 2000) (remarks of 
Dr. Collins), available at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/
project/clinton2.shtml. 
 2 Id. (remarks of President Clinton discussing the Human Genome Project). 
 3 PubMed database search conducted Jan. 25, 2013. 
 4 Iina Hellsten, From Sequencing to Annotating:  Extending the Metaphor of the Book of Life from 
Genetics to Genomics, 24 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y. 283 (2005). 
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is it wrong to grant ordinary laypeople direct access to the genomic 
Book of Life?  This echoes a theme from the English Protestant 
Reformation, when there was consternation about translating the Bi-
ble into vernacular (English-language) text that laypeople could read 
for themselves.5  Sharing genetic test results directly with test subjects6 
stirs similar sentiments. 
“[A] substantial debate has erupted over whether to offer research 
participants individual research results, especially in genetic and ge-
nomic research.”7  The question here is whether people who volun-
teer to serve as participants in genetic research should be able to 
learn the results of the experimental genetic tests that investigators 
performed on them.  Another debate concerns direct-to-consumer 
(“DTC”) genetic tests that individuals can order directly from a la-
boratory without having a physician act as an intermediary.8  A third 
and larger debate concerns the very future of clinical medicine:  Will 
the U.S. healthcare industry continue its “disease-oriented, reactive, 
and sporadic approach to care”9 in which medical professionals at-
tempt to summon miracles to redeem patients after their descent into 
illness, or will it shift to a model of “prospective medicine”10 that har-
nesses patients’ genetic and other diagnostic information in a life-
long, sustained journey to keep them well?  This latter mode—also 
known as “P4 Medicine (Predictive, Preventive, Personalized, and 
Participatory)”11—envisions a “far greater role for patient involve-
ment”12 in a continuous process of risk assessment, health promotion, 
 
 5 See generally JAMES SIMPSON, BURNING TO READ:  ENGLISH FUNDAMENTALISM AND ITS 
REFORMATION OPPONENTS 2 (2007) (discussing the development, during the period 
1520–1547, of a liberal reading culture in which individual religious adherents began to 
read holy scriptures for themselves without mediation by the clergy). 
 6 This Article uses the term “test subject” to refer to a person who has undergone laborato-
ry testing either as a patient or as a research participant.  A test subject is simply a person 
who has been tested with a genetic or other in vitro diagnostic test, either in a clinical or 
research setting. 
 7 Susan M. Wolf, The Challenge of Incidental Findings, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 216, 216 (2008); 
see also discussion and literature review infra Part II. 
 8 See, e.g., Jessica Elizabeth Palmer, Genetic Gatekeepers:  Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genomic 
Services in an Era of Participatory Medicine, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 475, 476–77 (2012) (dis-
cussing the challenges of regulating DTC genetic tests). 
 9 Ralph Snyderman & Ziggy Yoediono, Perspective:  Prospective Health Care and the Role of Aca-
demic Medicine:  Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way, 83 ACAD. MED. 707, 707 (2008). 
 10 Id. (defining prospective health care as personalized, predictive, preventive, and partici-
patory medicine). 
 11 INST. FOR SYS. BIOLOGY, ANNUAL REPORT:  PUSHING BOUNDARIES 2 (2010) (report of Dr. 
Leroy Hood). 
 12 Snyderman & Yoedino, supra note 9, at 707. 
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and disease minimization.  Greater patient involvement entails giving 
patients greater access to information than they have had in the past. 
The common thread in all of these debates is that they are dis-
putes about permissible flows of information from genetic and other 
diagnostic tests.  Specifically, may a party (such as an investigator or a 
laboratory) that possesses a person’s genetic test results communicate 
them to the test subject, or does law channel the communication 
through intermediaries or, perhaps, censor or suppress it altogether?  
Advances in the life sciences are “catalyzing a revolution in 
healthcare focused around an informational view of medicine.”13  Old 
laws from the past constrain flows of genetic information14 and, in do-
ing so, threaten this revolution.  This Article explores whether the 
First Amendment can help clear away old laws that limit genomic 
speech. 
Now, as in the Reformation, “[m]odernity and reading are inti-
mately bound; the formation of one powerful strand of modernity in 
the sixteenth century was, in good part, produced by a profound 
transformation in the way Europeans read.”15  The emergence of a 
liberal reading culture—premised on the capacity of individuals to 
read and debate the meaning of their sacred texts freely, directly, and 
unconstrained by intermediaries and institutional disciplines—was a 
“foundational element” of our modern understanding of ourselves.16  
Construction of the human genome—the process of coming to an 
understanding of what the Book of Life means—is fundamental to our 
future self-understanding.  Recent battles over access to genetic in-
formation are fights about who is entitled to have a go at construing 
the genome’s meaning.  “Books can unleash terrific energies”17 and 
the human genome is no exception.  People want to read it. 
There is a fairly broad consensus among bioethicists and state and 
federal regulators that scientific investigators’ communication of ge-
netic test results to research participants should be subject to prior 
review and content-based restrictions on what the participants can be 
told.18  The recommended restrictions often include outright bans on 
the return of results that are scientifically uncertain, that lack a well-
established clinical or reproductive significance, or that reveal risks 
 
 13 INST. FOR SYS. BIOLOGY, supra note 11, at 2. 
 14 See discussion infra Part I. 
 15 SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 2. 
 16 Id. at 2–3. 
 17 Id. at 10. 
 18 See discussion infra Part II (discussing bioethical concerns about the return of results) and 
infra Part I (discussing legal restrictions on the return of results). 
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about which little can be done given the limitations of current medi-
cal knowledge.19  Yet, many research participants are curious about 
their genomes and want to know what researchers found out about 
them.20  Investigators may feel strongly inclined to answer their ques-
tions whether out of civility, fear of liability, or respect for the re-
search participants, but they worry that doing so would violate a 
complex web of laws and regulations that restrict the return of exper-
imental test results.21 
Part I of this Article surveys these laws.  Part II surveys bioethical 
recommendations to limit or suppress the return of results and sur-
veys the bioethical rationales that support those recommendations.  
These include a litany of concerns about the dangers of communi-
cating complex and uncertain genetic findings to scientifically naïve 
research participants.  Doing so, it is feared, may mislead participants 
and potentially lead them to seek needless medical treatments or may 
inflict psycho-social harms such as making them feel anxious or stig-
matized.22  Moreover, putting scientific information into the hands of 
laypeople may bring about broader social and economic harms:  for 
example, wasteful healthcare spending as participants seek follow-up 
care in a quest to make sense of their genomes; depletion of research 
budgets by the allegedly high cost of returning results, and the possi-
bility that laypeople may propagate non-canonical understandings of 
the genome within the social networks they form during their search 
to decipher what their genomes mean.23 
No doubt unintentionally, the debate about return of results has 
taken on a striking resemblance to the 1520–1547 debate about trans-
lation of the English vernacular Bible.24  On one side of that debate 
were proponents of a liberal reading culture that welcomed ordinary 
laypeople to try their hand at interpreting canonical texts.  “No long-
er blocked and oppressed by a mediating institution, the individual 
Christian [was] finally able to read the Biblical text for him- or her-
 
 19 See discussion infra Part II. 
 20 Lisa S. Parker, Returning Individual Research Results:  What Role Should People’s Preferences 
Play?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 449, 456 (2012) (“What appears rather consistent across 
most of these studies is the finding that a substantial proportion of people express a de-
sire for receiving research results.”). 
 21 See discussion infra Part I (surveying various state and federal laws and regulations that 
restrict communication of experimental test results). 
 22 See infra Part II, Table 1. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 4 (dating this period from the importation of Lutheran the-
ology to England in 1520 to the death of Henry VIII in 1547 and the succession of an un-
equivocally Protestant king). 
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self.”25  A proponent of this view was William Tyndale who endured 
exile, burning of his works and, ultimately, execution at the age of 
forty-two for translating the Bible into English.26 
On the other side of this debate were learned men who saw it as 
their duty to protect the public from the hazards of individual Bible-
reading.27  Some of their concerns rang of self-interest by entrenched 
stakeholders who feared “innovations, commotions, and mutations”28 
if the public were allowed to bypass established church institutions 
and intermediaries.  But, part of their opposition reflected a sincere 
belief that it is safer for people to remain illiterate and rely on wiser 
minds to filter information for them.  Some commentators argued 
that Bible-reading may provoke fear or self-loathing by forcing people 
to traverse (all alone) “a tightrope of terror across the abyss of dam-
nation,”29 presumably the sixteenth-century equivalent of discovering 
that one has two copies of a high-penetrance, harmful allele for 
which medical science offers no effective risk mitigation strategy.  
Moreover, scripture is difficult to understand;30 common people are 
too ignorant to understand it;31 and “misconstruction of the Scrip-
ture” can cause real harm:  indeed, it can “slay the souls of men.”32  
John Stokesley, Bishop of London, felt it “abuseth the people in giv-
ing them liberty to read the scriptures, which doth nothing else but 
infect them with heresies.”33  John Standish even complained that 
“servants have been stubborn and recalcitrant ever since vernacular 
scripture was available to them.”34  Then, as now, thought-leaders 
pressed for regulatory solutions.  In 1542–1543, England enacted a 
statute entitled An Acte for the Advancement of True Religion to address 
disruptive translations that disseminate scripture to the public and 
 
 25 Id. at 23–24. 
 26 Id. at 34–37. 
 27 Id. at 42. 
 28 Id. at 58 (quoting GEORGE JOYE, A PRESENT CONSOLATION FOR THE SUFFERERS OF 
PERSECUCION FOR RYGHTWYSENES image 3 (Antwerp 1544), available at  
eebo.chadwyck.com). 
 29 Id. at 29. 
 30 Id. at 24 (summarizing the arguments of JOHN STANDISH, A DISCOURSE WHERIN IS 
DEBATED WHETHER IT BE EXPEDIENT THAT THE SCRIPTURE SHOULD BE IN ENGLISH FOR AL 
MEN TO READE THAT WYLL (London 1554), available at eebo.chadwyck.com). 
 31 Id. (citing STANDISH, supra note 30, at image 66); see also id. at 44 (citing Thomas More for 
the proposition that ignorant people would not understand scholastic terms, such that 
“[l]earned argument with them would be as effective as delivering an oration in French 
to Turkish speakers.”). 
 32 Id. at 42 (citing John Fischer, Bishop of Rochester). 
 33 Id. at 53. 
 34 Id. at 25 (citing STANDISH, supra note 30, at image 73). 
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“subvert the very true and perfect exposition . . . of the said Scripture, 
after their perverse fantasies.”35 
With the possible exception of Standish’s beef with his unruly 
servants, the arguments against the vernacular Bible are eerily similar 
to modern bioethical arguments against the return of results from 
genetic research (and Standish’s annoyance evokes the mutterings of 
modern clinicians whose patients pepper them with questions about 
medical articles that the patients gleaned from the Internet).  The 
thesis of this Article is that a sizable contingent of bioethicists and 
policy-makers may have reasoned themselves onto the wrong side of 
history on the matter of individual access to genetic test results.  
When one arrives at consensus with Tyndale’s executioners, the ques-
tion does arise. 
This Article focuses strictly on the return of experimental genetic 
test results although its findings also are relevant, with adaptations, to 
direct-to-consumer genetic tests and prospective medicine.  Parts III–
IV of this Article explore whether legal restrictions on the return of 
results from genomic research may violate the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.36  Past literature on the return of research re-
sults has focused heavily on investigators’ dutiesthat is, on identify-
ing situations when an investigator has an ethical or legal obligation 
to inform a research participant of results that could have medical or 
other significance to the individual.37  This Article examines a differ-
ent question:  whether investigators have a right to communicate re-
sults to a research participant who has expressed the desire to receive 
them.  This discussion presumes that the research participant has re-
quested return of results so that there is a consenting recipient.  
Moreover, the investigator is potentially willing to share the infor-
mation but is concerned that the requested communication may vio-
late a law or regulation.  This situation sets up the inquiry:  Is the re-
turn of results to a willing research subject a form of speech that is 
 
 35 Id. at 54. 
 36 Strictly speaking, the First Amendment addresses federal restrictions on speech, but un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment, state-law restrictions on speech also are subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny. 
 37 See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, The Role of Law in the Debate over Return of Research Results and Inci-
dental Findings:  The Challenge of Developing Law for Translational Science, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 435, 435–37 (2012) (noting concerns about potential liability for failure to return 
results); Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of 
Genomic Research, 14 GENETICS MED. 473, 475 (2012) (noting concerns despite the ab-
sence of statutory duties to return research results and a lack of lawsuits to date that 
found a tort duty to return such results). 
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entitled to protection under the First Amendment, such that laws that 
block such speech may be unconstitutional? 
The phrase “return of results” will refer to communication of in-
dividual results from a test performed in the context of research.  
This Article conceives the return of results in its most general sense 
without any presumption about whether the results have analytical 
validity,38 clinical validity,39 or clinical utility40/actionability.41  There 
also is no presumption about whether the result pertains to a focal or 
non-focal variable of the research studythat is, whether the result 
pertains to a gene that researchers specifically were studying or is an 
unrelated health finding that they happened to notice while examin-
ing the research participant or her test results.  Unless expressly not-
ed otherwise, return of results could involve any quality or type of re-
sults.  At one end of the spectrum, this includes well-validated results 
with high clinical or reproductive importance.  At the other end, it 
includes results with uncertain significance or dubious accuracy.  The 
discussion does, however, explore how the First Amendment analysis 
may vary depending on what is being returned (well-validated, medi-
cally significant results vs. results of uncertain significance). 
In contrast, much of the bioethical literature on this subject fo-
cuses on return of results that have clinical or reproductive signifi-
 
 38 See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF 
GENETIC TESTS:  RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT 15 (2000), available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/reports/oversight_report.pdf [hereinafter SACGT, 
2000 REPORT] (explaining that analytical validity is an indicator of how well a test 
measures the property or characteristic it is intended to measure and addresses such mat-
ters as the test’s accuracy, rate of false positives and negatives, and reliability in the sense 
of repeatedly getting the same result). 
 39 Id. at 15 n.11 (explaining that clinical validity refers to the accuracy with which a test pre-
dicts the presence or absence of a clinical condition or predisposition; it addresses 
whether there is a strong and well validated association between having a particular gene 
variant and having a particular health condition and whether knowing that a person has 
the gene variant offers meaningful insight into the person’s health or reproductive risks); 
see Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Genetic Research Re-
sults to Study Participants:  Updated Guidelines from a National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute 
Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574, 575 (2010) (expressing 
this concept by stating that a test result has an “established” meaning). 
 40 SACGT, 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at 15 n.12 (“Clinical utility refers to the usefulness 
of the test and the value of the information to the person being tested.  If a test has utili-
ty, it means that the resultspositive or negativeprovide information that is of value to 
the person being tested because he or she can use that information to seek an effective 
treatment or preventive strategy.  Even if no interventions are available to treat or prevent 
the disease or condition, there may be benefits associated with knowledge of the result.”). 
 41 Fabsitz et al., supra note 39, at 575 (“Actionable means that disclosure has the potential to 
lead to an improved health outcome; there must be established therapeutic or preventive 
interventions available or other available actions that may change the course of the dis-
ease.”). 
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cance.  For example, studies led by Professor Susan Wolf have de-
fined incidental findings (“IFs”)42 and individual research results 
(“IRRs”).43  Both IFs and IRRs are findings about an individual re-
search participant that have “potential health or reproductive im-
portance.”44  The distinction between IFs and IRRs turns on whether 
the finding pertains to a focal or non-focal variable in the studythat 
is, whether the finding arose within or outside the aims of the study.45  
Wolf’s research recognizes that this focal/non-focal distinction may 
have limited utility in the context of whole-exome, whole-genome, or 
genome-wide association studies where much or all of the genome is 
being studied, but it cites practical reasons for distinguishing IFs and 
IRRs.46  In this Article, return of results includes the return of IFs and 
IRRs, but also could include communicating additional findings that 
lack health or reproductive importance.  Returning results is simply 
the act of letting research participants “know what has been learned 
about them”47 even if a truthful disclosure would need to point out 
that the results are of uncertain quality and/or significance. 
Spurred by the advent of the printing press, the vernacular Bible 
was “unstoppably popular”48 despite thought-leaders’ concerns that it 
would slay its readers’ souls.  Some of the newly empowered six-
teenth-century readers left written accounts of the intensity and 
 
 42 See Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research:  Analysis 
and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 219 (2008) (“An IF [incidental finding] 
is a finding concerning an individual research participant that has potential health or re-
productive importance and is discovered in the course of conducting research but is be-
yond the aims of the study.”). 
 43 See Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Genomic Re-
search Involving Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, 14 GENETICS MED. 361, 364 (2012) (“[A]n 
IRR [individual research result] is a finding concerning an individual contributor that 
has potential health or reproductive importance and is discovered in the course of re-
search, when the finding is on the focal variables under study in meeting the stated aims 
of the research project.”). 
 44 See Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 219; Wolf et al., supra note 43 at 364. 
 45 Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 219; Wolf et al., supra note 43 at 364. 
 46 See Wolf et al., supra note 43, at 364 (noting that some institutions’ policies recognize this 
difference); see also Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 231 (noting that investigators are more 
likely to have expertise for interpreting individual research results that are within the 
scope of a study but may lack expertise to interpret incidental findings that are outside 
the scope of their research). 
 47 See 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL 
MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 72 (1999) [hereinafter 1 NBAC, 1999 
REPORT] (explaining that some writers, including R.M. Veatch, favor the return of inter-
im results on the basis that research participants have a right to know what has been 
learned about them) (citation omitted). 
 48 SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 56. 
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sweetness of reading the scriptures for themselves.49  As advances in 
genome sequencing technology bring us closer to the $1000 genome 
that ordinary people will be able to afford, many are burning to read 
this latest Book of Life wherein, to borrow words from Tyndale’s Pref-
ace, “every syllable pertaineth to thine own self.”50  Return of results is 
the act of opening the Book of Life and letting research participants 
peek into its pages.  Does the First Amendment protect the modern 
Tyndales who engage in these forbidden conversations? 
I.  RESTRICTIONS ON THE RETURN OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
Several interrelated sources of law potentially restrict communica-
tion of genetic test results to research participants.  These are sum-
marized below and contrasted with other restrictions that exist but 
are non-legal in nature. 
A.  State Statutes and Regulations 
Some ethicists advise that “[w]henever IFs are to be disclosed, 
they should be disclosed directly to the research participant.”51  Even 
when this approach has ethical advantages, it may raise legal issues in 
a number of U.S. states, because some states restrict the ability of la-
boratories to report test results directly to test subjects.  A recent sur-
vey of fifty-five U.S. states and territories found thirteen jurisdictions 
that only allow test results to be reported to a healthcare provider.52  
Seven more states allow results to be disclosed directly to the test sub-
ject only with the provider’s approval.53  These twenty states treat 
healthcare providers as intermediaries or gatekeepers in any com-
munication between laboratories and test subjects.  Only nine juris-
dictions (including seven states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico) provide a mechanism for reporting test results directly to the 
test subject.54 
 
 49 Id. at 57. 
 50 Id. at 57 (citing TYNDALE’S OLD TESTAMENT 8 (William Tyndale trans., David Daniell ed., 
1992)). 
 51 Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 240. 
 52 CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Results, 76 Fed. Reg. 
56712, 56717 (proposed Sept. 14, 2011) (to be codified 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 
164) (citing P. JON WHITE & JODI DANIEL, RTI INT’L, PRIVACY AND SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
FOR INTEROPERABLE HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE:  RELEASING CLINICAL LABORATORY 
TEST RESULTS:  REPORT ON SURVEY OF STATE LAWS (2009)). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
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The law is silent in the remaining twenty-six states and territories: 
direct reporting of results to test subjects is not forbidden but neither 
does the law allow it.55  When law is silent, other sources of norms 
such as professional standards, customs, or investigators’ own beliefs 
may determine test subjects’ access to their results.  Informal norms 
of this sort ordinarily do not count as legal restrictions on the return 
of results unless they are enforceable by law, for example, if a state’s 
medical licensure laws allow disciplinary action for violation of a pro-
fessional ethics norm.56  Ethical standards that restrict speech can 
raise constitutional questions, just as a law would do, if compliance 
with the standards is obligatory under a law or regulation.  Profes-
sional standards of ethics have been challenged on First Amendment 
grounds in situations where states used disbarment or disciplinary 
proceedings to enforce attorneys’ compliance with standards of legal 
ethics.57 
B.  State Common Law 
To date, investigators have not actually faced tort lawsuits in rela-
tion to return of genetic test results.58  Medical malpractice cases can 
arise only in the context of medical practice activities.59  Return of re-
sults, even though it may address topics that also arise during medical 
practice encounters, is distinct from the practice of medicine.60  “Be-
cause the express or implied consent of the physician is required” in 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion:  A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physi-
cian Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 947–48 (discussing the ability of states to regulate 
“professional speech,” or communications professionals make in the course of their pro-
fessional practices, through various mechanisms such as disciplinary license proceedings 
and medical malpractice actions aimed at maintaining reasonable standards of compe-
tency and compliance with professional standards). 
 57 See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 193–96 (1982) (challenging standards of legal ethics 
that sought to protect clients from misleading speech by restricting the words attorneys 
could use to describe their qualifications and practice areas); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 
433 U.S. 350, 353 (1977) (challenging ethical rules restricting advertising by attorneys). 
 58 See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 37, at 475 (noting that no lawsuits have found investi-
gators liable for failure to return results); see also Wolf, supra note 37, at 436–37 (noting 
the apparent absence of suits for mishandling this issue in either direction—either failing 
to return findings or for wrongly doing so). 
 59 See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of 
Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 844 (1999) (“[A] plaintiff in a malpractice case 
must demonstrate that the challenged advice not only was issued by a physician, but that 
it was conveyed in the context of a physician-patient relationship.”). 
 60 See Barbara J. Evans, Minimizing Liability Risks Under the ACMG Recommendations for Report-
ing Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS MED. 915 
(2013); see also discussion infra Part IV.E. 
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order for a physician-patient relationship to come into being, “the 
physician must take some affirmative action with regard to treatment 
of a patient in order for the relationship to be established.”61  Even 
assuming the research investigator happens to be a physician, the re-
turn of results does not involve the critical treatment step.  “A physi-
cian-patient relationship is not established by the mere act of a physi-
cian agreeing to see a patient at a later time or suggesting that the 
patient contact another physician.”62  A medical malpractice suit 
based on return of results seemingly must founder because return of 
results is not the practice of medicine.63 
This fact has not stopped investigators and commentators from 
feeling concern about potential legal liability either “for failure to re-
turn findings on one side, [or] . . . for wrongly returning on the oth-
er.”64  Unlike state statutes and regulations that can actually ban be-
haviors, tort lawsuits allow the behavior to occur, but may impose 
sanctions (such as requiring the payment of damages) for engaging 
in the behavior.65  Clearly, though, the threat of having to pay damag-
es can discourage behavior just as effectively as an outright ban would 
do.  Assiduous worriers are able to envision scenarios in which an in-
vestigator might be sued for returning results:  for example, for neg-
ligently returning results that later prove wrong, for returning results 
without obtaining a properly informed consent to do so, or for inflict-
ing emotional or physical harms by returning results.  Such suits (and 
the perceived threat of such suits) chill the return of results and thus 
constitute a legal restriction on the return of results.  Again, this lia-
bility remains largely theoretical at present as no cases appear to have 
been brought as of this date. 
C.  Federal Restrictions on Communication of Results from CLIA-Certified 
Laboratories 
The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 
(“CLIA”) place various restrictions on the communication of results 
 
 61 Amy G. Gore et al., Relation of Physician and Patient:  Consensual Relationship and Contractual 
Agreements, 61 AM. JUR. 2D PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS, ETC. § 130 (updated Feb. 2013). 
 62 Id. (citing Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d. 934, 941 (Kan. 2001) and Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l 
Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132, 140 (Kan. 2001), as corrected May 9, 2001). 
 63 See, e.g., Ande v. Rock, 647 N.W.2d 265 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (deciding, in a suit involving 
non-return of a diagnosis of cystic fibrosis in a research setting, that research is not the 
practice of medicine); see also discussion infra Part IV.E. 
 64 Wolf, supra note 37, at 437. 
 65 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000) (discussing the differ-
ence between statutory proscriptions and tort sanctions). 
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to test subjects.  Even when testing is performed at a CLIA-certified 
lab, returning results directly to test subjects may be unlawful for rea-
sons explained below.  The current CLIA regulation at 42 C.F.R. 
§ 493.1291(f) limits disclosure of test results from CLIA-compliant 
labs to three categories of persons.  First, CLIA allows disclosure of 
test results to “authorized persons,”66 which CLIA defines as including 
those authorized by state law to order or receive test results.67  In 
states that restrict the reporting of results to individual test subjects, 
CLIA incorporates those same restrictions.  In 2011, the Department 
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) proposed to amend the 
CLIA regulation to allow test subjects to have greater access to their 
own test results,68 but the final rule has not yet been issued.  Until an 
amended regulation goes into effect, test subjects can receive direct 
access to results from CLIA-compliant labs only in states that allow di-
rect reporting.  When state law is silent, HHS interprets CLIA as treat-
ing individual test subjects as authorized persons.69  Thus, HHS views 
CLIA as allowing disclosure of results to test subjects in the nine states 
and territories that expressly allow it and in the twenty-six jurisdic-
tions where law is silent.70  The remaining two categories of persons 
who can receive CLIA-certified test results are as follows:  CLIA-
certified labs may report results to the person responsible for using 
the test results in the treatment contextthat is, to a healthcare pro-
vider.71  Also, in the case of reference labs, CLIA allows reporting of 
results to the referring lab.72 
An important caveat is that the CLIA amendments proposed in 
2011 would not apply to all laboratories, but only to CLIA-compliant 
labs that also are subject to the major federal privacy regulation 
known as the HIPAA Privacy Rule.73  Section 164.524 of the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule grants patients a right to inspect and obtain copies of 
the patients’ own protected health information that doctors, hospi-
 
 66 42 C.F.R. § 493.1291(f). 
 67 42 C.F.R. § 493.2. 
 68 CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 52. 
 69 See id. at 56717 (stating that HHS believes its proposed rule allowing test subjects direct 
access to their test results would have no impact in states where law is silent, thus implying 
that HHS interprets the silence of state law as permitting direct disclosure already). 
 70 Id. 
 71 42 C.F.R. § 493.1291(f). 
 72 Id. 
 73 CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 52, at 56715 (“As a result of this pro-
posal, HIPAA covered entities that are laboratories subject to CLIA would have the same 
obligations as other types of covered healthcare providers with respect to providing indi-
viduals with access to their protected health information . . . .”); see also HIPAA Privacy 
Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164. 
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tals, and other HIPAA-covered healthcare providers hold in “desig-
nated record sets” (“DRS”).74  A DRS includes medical and billing 
records and other information “[u]sed in whole or in part, by or for 
the covered entity to make decisions about individuals.”75  CLIA-
compliant laboratories traditionally have enjoyed an exception and 
were not subject to this § 164.524 disclosure requirement.76  Thus, the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule gave patients access to the test results that labs 
had reported to physicians or hospitals, but not to other information 
generated during the testing process and stored in the lab’s own files.  
This difference is crucially important in an era of whole genome and 
exome sequencing, which test many thousands of genetic variants 
within a person’s genome, many of which may be irrelevant to the 
disease that caused the physician to order the testing and which 
therefore may never be reported back to the physician.77  To have ac-
cess to all the personal genetic information generated during testing, 
test subjects need a right of access to information held by labs.  The 
CLIA amendments proposed in 2011 seemingly would give test sub-
jects that right with respect to genetic information held by CLIA-
compliant labs that are subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.78  Even af-
ter these amendments, however, there will be ongoing problems with 
 
 74 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (describing the individual’s general right to inspect and 
obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual in a designated rec-
ord set). 
 75 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (defining the term “designated record set”). 
 76 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1)(iii). 
 77 See generally James P. Evans, Return of Results:  Not That Complicated?,  14 GENETICS MED. 
358, 358–59 (2012) (describing whole genome sequencing and explaining that it may 
generate large amounts of extra genetic information that has questionable relevance to 
human health, which some test subjects may nevertheless want to know). 
 78 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (clarifying, in recent revisions to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, that ge-
netic information is health information for purposes of HIPAA); see also U.S. Dep’t. of 
Health & Human Servs., Off. of the Ass’t Sec’y for Planning and Evaluation, Standards for 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (Final Rule), 65 Fed. Reg.  82,462, 
82,605–06  (Dec. 28, 2000) (providing guidance on the meaning of the term “designated 
record set” and noting that a DRS includes information that “may be used” (not merely is 
used) “in whole or in part” to make decisions about individuals; that it includes all data 
that “are normally used, and are reasonably likely to be used, to make decisions” and not 
just information that “already has been used”; that it “includes records that are used to 
make decisions about any individuals, whether or not the records have been used to make 
a decision about the particular individual requesting access”; and that the DRS is not lim-
ited to data “used to make healthcare decisions, because other decisions by covered enti-
ties can also affect individuals’ interests.”).  This guidance strongly suggests the 2011 pro-
posed rule change would grant test subjects access not just to completed test reports but 
to most or all of the genetic information that a CLIA-compliant, HIPAA-covered laborato-
ry has on file about them. 
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individual access to data held by non-CLIA labs and labs that are not 
subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 
D.  Federal Restrictions on Communication of Results from Non-CLIA-
Certified Research Laboratories 
The regulation at 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) is commonly known as 
the CLIA research exception.  It allows research laboratories to oper-
ate without CLIA certification provided they adhere to certain limits 
on their activities.  CLIA’s certification requirements are triggered if 
research laboratories “report patient specific results for the diagnosis, 
prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the as-
sessment of the health of individual patients.”79  There has been on-
going debate about how to interpret this provision.  Seemingly au-
thoritative sources assert that the CLIA regulations “prohibit the 
return of results to patients unless the laboratory is CLIA certified.”80  
CLIA training materials assert that CLIA “[i]ncludes research when 
results are returned [and] specimens have unique ID.”81  These 
statements interpret § 493.3(b)(2) as requiring CLIA certification if 
patient-specific results are returned for any purpose.  Quite clearly, 
that is not what the regulation says. 
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[T]he meaning of a statute 
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act 
is framed.”82  The same is true of regulations:  the best guide to their 
meaning is to read them.  Section 493.3(b)(2) requires CLIA certifi-
cation only if a laboratory reports results for specific, enumerated 
purposes:  diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease and as-
sessment of health.  According to the plain text of the regulation, re-
turning results for other purposes does not trigger CLIA’s certifica-
tion requirements.  By analogy, a regulation that requires people to 
hold a driver’s license if they use a car for driving does not require a 
license if they use a car for other purposes (such as riding, investing, 
or living in the car).  In construing legal texts, courts “lean in favor of 
 
 79 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2). 
 80 SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF 
GENETIC TESTING:  A RESPONSE TO THE CHARGE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES 128 (2008) [hereinafter “SACGHS, 2008 REPORT”]. 
 81 Judy Yost, Div. of Lab. Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Quick CLIA 101 & 
CLIA Compliance  sl. 3 (2003) (unpublished visual presentation), available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/meetings/October2003/Yost.pdf. 
 82 See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 
U.S. 212, 225 (2002); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing the plain meaning rule). 
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a construction which will render every word operative, rather than 
one which may make some of them idle and nugatory.”83  This “sur-
plusage canon” of legal construction requires that “[i]f possible, every 
word and every provision is to be given effect . . . . None should be 
ignored” or treated as having no consequence.84  Administrative law 
judges follow this canon when interpreting the CLIA statute and reg-
ulations.85  It violates the surplusage canon to assert that any return of 
patient-specific results triggers a need for CLIA certification.  Doing 
so ignores an important qualifying clause:  CLIA certification is re-
quired only if labs “report patient specific results for the diagnosis, pre-
vention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the 
health of individual patients.”86 
Unfortunately, the CLIA regulations do not define what it means 
for a report to be for the enumerated purposes (as opposed to being 
for some other purpose).  CLIA stratifies legal compliance obliga-
tions based on the purpose of lab test results, yet it supplies no guid-
ance on how this purpose should be assessed.  This is a serious defect 
of the CLIA regulations.  For comparison, consider the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) medical device regulations.  They 
also stratify regulatory compliance obligations based on a test’s pur-
pose.  If an in vitro diagnostic product is “intended for use in the di-
agnosis of disease,”87 the manufacturer must comply with certain FDA 
labeling requirements.88  Devices “intended for processing, repacking, 
or use in the manufacture of another drug or device” are exempt 
from these requirements.89  As in CLIA’s research exemption, having 
a diagnostic purpose gives rise to regulatory compliance obligations. 
Unlike CLIA, however, the FDA device regulations define how to 
assess a device’s purpose.90  Such an assessment requires decisions 
 
 83 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 58 (1868). 
 84 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
174–79 (2012) (discussing the surplusage canon). 
 85 See, e.g., In re Blanding Urgent Care Ctr. Lab. v. Health Care Fin. Admin., No. CR438, 
1996 WL 600630, at *1, *14 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Sept. 30, 1996) (“A cardi-
nal rule of statutory construction is to interpret the statute in such a way that no part is 
rendered meaningless.”). 
 86 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 87 21 C.F.R. § 801.119. 
 88 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1) (requiring adequate di-
rections for use); see also 21 C.F.R. § 809.10 (describing labeling requirements for in vitro 
diagnostic products). 
 89 21 C.F.R. § 801.122. 
 90 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (“The words intended uses or words of similar import in §§ 801.5, 
801.119, and 801.122 refer to the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for 
the labeling of devices.  The intent is determined by such person’s expressions or may be 
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about a number of matters.  Obviously, a key question is whether di-
agnostic purpose will be gauged by the intent of the device manufac-
turer or by how the device actually is used by practitioners and pa-
tients.  If intent is determinative, then what sources of evidence will 
the FDA use to infer the manufacturer’s subjective intent?  For ex-
ample, will the agency consider only product labeling, advertise-
ments, and official statements by the manufacturer, or will it also con-
sider statements by sales representatives and informal statements 
(such as a manufacturer’s internal e-mails)?  What happens if a man-
ufacturer does not intend a device to be used for a diagnostic pur-
pose yet is aware it is being so used? Does delivering a device with 
awareness that it will be put to an unintended use constitute intent 
for the device to have that use, or not?  If persons other than the 
manufacturer alter a device’s intended use, are they (rather than the 
manufacturer) responsible for complying with the FDA regulations?  
All of these questions are addressed in the FDA’s definition of “in-
tended use”91 and in court cases that have interpreted the meaning of 
that phrase.92 
In contrast, the CLIA regulation fails to explain how the regulator 
will assess the purpose of a test report.  Consequently, the CLIA regu-
lation is vague in the sense that a person of ordinary intelligence 
would not necessarily know what the regulation prohibits.  Indeed, 
 
shown by the circumstances surrounding the distribution of the article.  This objective in-
tent may, for example, be shown by labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written 
statements by such persons or their representatives.  It may be shown by the circumstanc-
es that the article is, with the knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered 
and used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised.  The intended uses 
of an article may change after it has been introduced into interstate commerce by its 
manufacturer.  If, for example, a packer, distributor, or seller intends an article for dif-
ferent uses than those intended by the person from whom he received the device, such 
packer, distributor, or seller is required to supply adequate labeling in accordance with 
the new intended uses.  But if a manufacturer knows, or has knowledge of facts that 
would give him notice that a device introduced into interstate commerce by him is to be 
used for conditions, purposes, or uses other than the ones for which he offers it, he is re-
quired to provide adequate labeling for such a device which accords with such other uses 
to which the article is to be put.”). 
 91 Id. 
 92 See, e.g., United States v. An Undetermined No. of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d. 1026, 1028–
29 (10th Cir. 1994) (determining that specimen collection containers used in testing for 
the presence of HIV were “intended for use in diagnosis of disease” as this phrase is un-
derstood in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, even though the specimen containers had 
been used as part of a protocol that produced inconclusive diagnostic results); United 
States v. 25 Cases, More or Less, of an Article of Device, 942 F.2d 1179, 1181–83 (7th Cir. 
1991) (holding that the term “diagnosis” in 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) encompasses articles 
that screen for possible symptoms of disease even if the screening does not provide final 
identification of the condition). 
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people with considerable expertise may find this regulation unclear.  
Exemplifying this uncertainty, Wolf et al. warn that 42 C.F.R. § 
493.3(b)(2) “may mean that under current regulations, research labs 
may not report ‘research results’ when these are individual-specific 
and may be used to assess health or trigger such assessment.”93  While 
it seems unlikely that a court would hold that urging a person to seek 
a health assessment is itself a health assessment, the sheer vagueness 
of CLIA’s research exception does invite such speculation.  To date, 
no court cases have clarified the meaning of the phrase “for the di-
agnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or 
the assessment of the health of individual patients” in § 493.3(b)(2).94 
CLIA certification clearly seems to be required when investigators 
plan to use test results in a way that affects the course of care for 
study participants (for example, to assign participants to the treat-
ment arm of a study).95  If test results are not so used, clinicians and 
investigators confront a legal gray area:  Does merely communicating 
test results to study participants amount to the type of reporting that, 
under § 493.3(b)(2), triggers a need for CLIA compliance?  This le-
gal uncertainty is chilling communication of results from non-CLIA-
certified labs.  A National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute 
(“NHLBI”) Working Group noted that there is significant disagree-
ment about “what constitutes compliance with the CLIA regulations 
for the return of research results in genetics studies” and that “[t]his 
is a high-impact issue.”96 
E.  Federal Restrictions on Communication Under the Common Rule 
As a condition of receiving research funding from the National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”), investigators are required to comply 
with the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects,97 or 
“Common Rule.”98 The Common Rule requires approval and ongoing 
oversight of research by an Institutional Review Board (“IRB”).  Alt-
hough IRBs are private ethical review bodies often staffed by employ-
 
 93 Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 246 n.81. 
 94 Based on a search of Westlaw’s state and federal judicial database for cases citing 42 
C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2). 
 95 Kathy Todd, Div. of Lab. Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CLIA and Clinical 
Trials sl. 9 (unpublished visual presentation). 
 96 Fabsitz et al., supra note 39, at 576. 
 97 See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (“Common Rule”), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
 98 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–46.124. 
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ees of the institution that is conducting the research,99 their involve-
ment in research oversight is required by federal regulations.  If an 
IRB restricts the return of research results to participants in an NIH-
funded study, this restriction can be characterized as a condition on 
the receipt of a federal grant.  Such restrictions, therefore, count as 
legally imposed restrictions on the communication of results from 
federally funded research. 
It may raise constitutional issues for the NIH to place speech-
restricting conditions on its grants, and this is true even though the 
NIH is free to withhold grants altogether.  An example helps clarify 
the potential problem.  If it is unconstitutional for the federal gov-
ernment to refuse to let women vote, it is equally unconstitutional for 
the government to award monetary grants to women on condition 
that recipients must voluntarily agree not to vote.  The “government 
may not do indirectly what it may not do directly.”100  The notoriously 
enigmatic101 doctrine of unconstitutional conditions102 addresses 
whether particular restrictions on federal spending violate the Consti-
tution.  If it would violate the Constitution for the federal govern-
ment to muzzle investigators directly, then it potentially may violate 
the Constitution for NIH to condition its grants on oversight by pri-
vate IRBs that do the day-to-day work of restricting investigators’ 
speech.103 
Here, it is timely to distinguish Rust v. Sullivan,104 which upheld a 
rule that prevented federally funded family planning clinics from of-
fering advice on “abortion as a method of family planning.”105  Rust 
arose in a medical practice setting, not a research setting, and it is 
recognized that “speech in the physician-patient relationship may be 
regulated in a manner that speech outside that context cannot.”106  
Moreover, the Court in Rust did not answer whether “traditional rela-
tionships such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy pro-
tection under the First Amendment from Government regulation, 
 
 99 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.103(b), 46.107–46.108 (describing IRBs). 
100 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989). 
101 See id. at 1415–16 (characterizing Supreme Court cases addressing unconstitutional con-
ditions as “a minefield to be traversed gingerly”). 
102 See id. at 1415 (“The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may 
not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, 
even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”). 
103 It was beyond the scope of this Phase I study to conduct a full analysis of IRB-imposed 
speech restrictions under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions; that inquiry is 
scheduled for a later phase of this ongoing research project. 
104 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
105 Id. at 180. 
106 Halberstam, supra note 59, at 846. 
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even when subsidized by the Government.”107  Instead, the decision 
turned on the fact that the physician was rendering services in a pro-
gram that offered a narrow, federally defined scope of healthcare ser-
vices, such that patients would not expect to receive comprehensive 
medical advice.108  Rust did not hold that federal subsidies nullify the 
First Amendment rights of physicians, and it certainly did not make 
any statement about how federal subsidies affect the First Amend-
ment rights of researchers.  The 2013 decision in Agency for Interna-
tional Development v. Alliance for Open Society,109 a case that involved 
compelled speech rather than speech restrictions, further demon-
strates that entities who receive federal funding still have First 
Amendment rights.110 
Because IRBs have significant discretion to make decisions about 
the return of results, there are no explicit substantive rules that man-
date how return of results must be handled under the Common Rule.  
Individual IRBs do, however, refer to a variety of sources for sugges-
tions about ethically appropriate approaches to the return of results.  
These sources include scholarly bioethical studies and recommenda-
tions prepared by governmental advisory bodies and independent 
working groups.  Because these recommendations influence institu-
tional policies and IRB decisions about return of results, Part II re-
views several such sources and identifies recurring themes.  This Arti-
cle treats these bioethical recommendations as an indicator of the 
speech restrictions investigators may face as a result of regulation un-
der the Common Rule. 
F.  Non-Legal Forms of Restriction 
In addition to the legal restrictions just described, investigators 
encounter additional constraints on the communication of research 
results to study participants.  These include restrictions imposed by 
private parties whether as a result of custom, institutional policy, or 
misunderstanding of the law.  For example, some investigators have 
encountered difficulty publishing their works in academic journals 
after scientific peer reviewers asserted that the investigators had bro-
ken the law by returning results from non-CLIA-certified laboratories 
 
107 500 U.S. at 200. 
108 Id. 
109 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). 
110 Id. at 2330 (“This case is not about the Government’s ability to enlist the assistance of 
those with whom it already agrees.  It is about compelling a grant recipient to adopt a 
particular belief as a condition of funding.”). 
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to research participants.  Scientific peer reviewers, presumably lack-
ing any training in law or legal process, wield the power to suppress 
publication of studies by alleging that return of results is illegal.  For 
purposes of First Amendment analysis, these privately imposed sanc-
tions must be distinguished from the legally imposed sanctions de-
scribed earlier.  The U.S. Constitution protects against wrongs im-
posed by government, but offers no remedy for privately imposed 
wrongs.  There is no constitutional remedy if private parties, such as 
peer reviewers or academic journal editors, impose hardships on in-
vestigators who choose to return results to study participants. 
The Constitution does, however, limit the power of state and fed-
eral governments to restrict communication, whether through state 
laws that forbid disclosure of test results to research participants or 
through federal laws such as the CLIA regulations and the Common 
Rule.  The remainder of this Article explores whether the resulting 
restrictions on investigators’ communication with research partici-
pants may violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
II.  THE BIOETHICAL VIEW OF SPEECH RESTRICTIONS 
The field of bioethics has never fully engaged with the question of 
whether it is ethical to regulate or ban communication.  The founda-
tional principles of bioethics, such as those set out in the Belmont 
Report,111 unquestionably are broad enough to sustain an inquiry into 
whether it is appropriate to suppress communication among consent-
ing adults.  The absence of a well-developed, systematic bioethical in-
quiry appears to be the product of neglect or lack of interest, rather 
than a logical consequence of the ethical principles bioethicists em-
brace. 
The principles of respect for autonomy and respect for persons 
clearly would support such an inquiry.  Speech restrictions may con-
flict with these principles:  restrictions on consensual communica-
tions implicate autonomy interests of both the speaker and the lis-
tener,112 and it potentially displays contempt for persons (rather than 
 
111 See OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, BELMONT REPORT:  
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
RESEARCH, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979) [hereinafter, “BELMONT REPORT”] (set-
ting out broad ethical principles to guide the protection of human research subjects, in-
cluding beneficence, nonmaleficence, respect for persons and respect for their autono-
my, and justice). 
112 See 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 72 (citing Veatch for the idea that the princi-
ple of autonomy dictates that subjects have a right to know what has been learned about 
them) (internal citation omitted); Mark A. Rothstein, Tiered Disclosure Options Promote the 
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respect for persons) to presume that they are too credulous or ill-
informed to make appropriate use of communications provided to 
them.  Decisions to regulate or ban speech are thus rich in potential 
bioethical issues.  Nevertheless, the bioethics literature, with some 
frequency, recommends speech restrictions as a way to protect hu-
man research subjects.  For example, the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (“NBAC”) has stated, 
Experts disagree about whether findings from research should be com-
municated to subjects, although most do believe that findings should not 
be conveyed unless they are confirmed and reliable and constitute clini-
cally significant or scientifically relevant information.  Those who oppose 
revealing unconfirmed findings argue that the harms that could result 
from revealing preliminary data are serious, including anxiety or unnec-
essary (and possibly harmful) medical interventions.  They prefer to 
avoid such harms by controlling the flow of information to subjects and 
by limiting communications to those that constitute reliable infor-
mation.113 
Note how casually this passage states that “findings should not be 
conveyed” and discusses “controlling the flow of information to sub-
jects.”  Contrast NBAC’s statement with that of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which has described freedom of speech as so important that its 
“suppression or abridgement . . . cannot be regarded otherwise than 
with grave concern”114 and also has noted that the “loss of First 
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unques-
tionably constitutes irreparable injury.”115  As discussed below, many 
bioethicists treat two major classes of speech restrictions as unobjec-
tionable and even desirable in connection with the return of results:  
(1) restrictions on the content of what investigators and participants 
 
Autonomy and Well-Being of Research Subjects, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 20, 20 (2006) (discussing 
respect for autonomy as entailing consideration of participants’ formulations of benefit, 
harm, and acceptable risk); Isaac S. Kohane & Patrick L. Taylor, Multidimensional Results 
Reporting to Participants in Genomic Studies: Getting It Right, 2 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 1 
(2010) (considering the impact of return of results on participants’ personhood and au-
tonomy); Sharon F. Terry, The Tension Between Policy and Practice in Returning Research Re-
sults and Incidental Findings in Genomic Biobank Research, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 691, 
698 (2012) (noting that some nations’ policies give stronger recognition to the rights of 
research participants to be informed of their genetic data than do U.S. policies). 
113 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71. 
114 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 382 
(1973) (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
115 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)); see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 
486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988) (noting that suppressed opportunities for speech are irretrieva-
bly lost). 
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may discuss, and (2) prior censorship116 of investigators’ speechthat 
is, oversight and approval of speech before the speech takes place. 
A.  Content-Based Restrictions on the Return of Results 
The bioethics community appears generally comfortable with the 
notion of limiting speech about certain types of research results.  
There are particular concerns about returning uncertain results, even 
with appropriate disclaimers.  Bookman et al. counsel “extreme cau-
tion”117 in returning results that are preliminary and not validated by 
other studies.  Parker has noted that “[i]t is generally, though not 
uniformly, agreed that unreliable results ought not be offered back to 
individuals.”118  Reliability often is framed in terms of the analytical 
validity of the test and factors that bear on the quality of the laborato-
ry that performed the test, such as the competence of lab personnel 
and whether controls are in place to avoid mixing up biospecimens 
collected from different test subjects.  CLIA-certified laboratories im-
plement quality standards aimed at avoiding errors and mix-ups, but 
non-CLIA certified research labs may or may not follow equivalent 
standards.119  When bioethicists recommend suppressing the return 
results from non-CLIA-certified labs,120 this may be for legal reasons 
(because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that CLIA requires this) or 
for ethical reasons (because they believe CLIA certification helps pro-
tect human research participants by improving the reliability of test 
 
116 Many bioethicists have objected to the use of “censorship” to describe the role ethics re-
view bodies play in overseeing the return of results.  The ordinary dictionary meaning of 
this term merely involves prior review of a proposed communication with the aim of sup-
pressing unacceptable parts of it.  See, e.g., Oxford Dictionaries, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/censor (defining the 
verb “censor” as meaning to “examine (a book, movie, etc.) officially and suppress unac-
ceptable parts of it”).  By this definition, the term “censorship” fairly describes the role of 
ethics review bodies in determining which results are unacceptable for return.  There is 
no intent to suggest Orwellian ideological control or political repression. 
117 Ebony B. Bookman et al., Reporting Genetic Results in Research Studies: Summary and Recom-
mendations of an NHLBI Working Group, 140 AM. J. MED. GENETICS pt. A, 1033, 1037 (2006). 
118 Parker, supra note 20, at 452. 
119 See Scott D. Jewell, Perspective on Biorepository Return of Results and Incidental Findings, 13 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 655, 665 (2012) (discussing the advantages of CLIA’s require-
ments for proficiency, certification, and quality control in biospecimen repositories that 
plan to return results). 
120 See id. at 663 (“CLIA is clearly a requirement and the process on the engagement of CLIA-
licensed assay reporting is well known . . . .”); Karen J. Maschke, Returning Genetic Research 
Results:  Considerations for Existing No-Return and Future Biobanks, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
559, 566–67 (2012) (“Commentators disagree about how to interpret CLIA requirements 
in the research context. . . . [But] [s]ome institutions may require genetic research results 
to be CLIA-validated before they are offered to biospecimen donors.”). 
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results).  Among commentators there is “a near-universal demand for 
analytic validity as a precondition” for return of results.121 
Many commentators additionally call for results to be returned 
only if they have clinical validitythat is, a well-established clinical or 
reproductive significance.122  Even when test results satisfy basic crite-
ria of analytical and clinical validity, many bioethicists feel results 
should not be returned unless they also have clinical utility or action-
ability.123  If there are no treatments or other measures a person can 
take to address the risks associated with having a gene mutation, then 
returning test results would merely imbue the participant with idle 
knowledge to which there is no practical response. 
Restrictions on the return of results may serve important bioethi-
cal values, but there are competing values at stake, including values 
that the First Amendment protects.  A free-speech advocate might 
voice the following concerns:  controlling access to information can 
manipulate people’s viewpoints.  Apart from forcing participants to 
walk “a tightrope of terror across the abyss of damnation,”124 inform-
ing people that they have problems for which medical science has no 
solutions could cause them to view healthcare providers as powerless 
and thus may lower healthcare institutions in the public’s esteem.  
This latter point has not been raised in the bioethics literature, but 
there are obvious stakeholder advantages in censoring speech about 
swathes of the genome that reduce our learned intermediaries to 
tongue-tied stammering, while permitting free discussion of actiona-
ble findingsthat is, those that showcase healthcare providers’ ability 
to perform miracles.  Censoring the return of non-actionable results 
fosters a point of view that members of the scientific and medical 
communities are competent and that their expertise can improve 
people’s lives.  From a free-speech standpoint, it is disturbing to 
 
121 Wolf, supra note 37, at 446; see also Ingrid A. Holm & Patrick L. Taylor, The Informed Cohort 
Oversight Board:  From Values to Architecture, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 669, 676 (2012) 
(supporting disclosure of information even if its clinical significance is uncertain but re-
quiring that it be analytically valid). 
122 See, e.g., 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71; Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 235; see 
also Maschke, supra note 120, at 559 (citing the fact that most genetic research results 
have uncertain clinical significance as a reason why many biobanks adopt a “no-return” 
policy).  But see id. at 559–60 (noting that some commentators contend that persons who 
contribute biospecimens for research should have access to genetic test results even if the 
information is of uncertain clinical significance). 
123 See Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 231 (“Disclosure should occur only when findings are val-
id and confirmed, have significant health implications, and the health problem can be 
treated.”). 
124 SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 29. 
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channel research participants’ thoughts toward this (or any other) 
viewpoint. 
Suppressing speech about genes that lack clinical validity and util-
ity also helps keep the genome medical by permitting the public to 
learn about their genes only in situations where their genes are medi-
cal.  This fosters a control relationship in which medical institutions 
remain keepers of the Book of Life, to be discussed only in terms that 
they define.  In the way of all sacred texts, the human genome is sus-
ceptible to many meanings, just as the Christian scriptures are vari-
ously viewed as a religious text, a work of soaring literary beauty, an 
anthropological or historical record, and a tract advancing a deeply 
subversive social program to resist Roman imperialism and empower 
the meek, unpropertied masses.  In the same way, the human ge-
nome offers many meanings, not all of them medical. 
Banning the return of non-clinically-significant results is a form of 
censorship that advances a favored point of view that the human ge-
nome has one true meaning, which is medical.  A public indoctrinat-
ed with this point of view may channel its natural curiosity about the 
human genome into political support for a large federal research 
budget to fund medical exegesis of the genome.  This public may tol-
erate the cost in time and money of having medical intermediaries 
order their tests for them and may press their insurers to cover 
healthcare visits in which people consult with the medical keepers of 
the human genome (which has one true meaning, which is medical).  
Suppressing the return of results that lack clinical validity and utility 
advances a point of view that favors continuance of entrenched 
healthcare institutional arrangements.  The bioethics literature has 
not explored this possibility, although it would be of obvious concern 
to a free-speech advocate. 
An emerging strand of bioethics does explore the possibility that 
information may have personal utility or meaning even when it is not 
actionable in the sense of contributing to improved health out-
comes.125  Still, not all bioethicists agree that personal meaning sup-
plies a legitimate basis for returning results.126  “[T]he literature on 
 
125 See Terry, supra note 112, at 710–11 (discussing the emerging concept of “personal utili-
ty”); see also Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 231 n.80 (citing various sources for the proposi-
tion that results should be returned only if they have clinical utility, but noting that there 
is debate about what constitutes “clinical utility” with some definitions focusing narrowly 
on health outcomes while others admit a broader concept that a result has utility if it is 
important to the individuals and families involved). 
126 Fabsitz et al., supra note 39, at 578 (noting that some members of the NHLBI working 
group dissented from its recommendation that investigators “may choose” to disclose “re-
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whether to return individual research results commonly discourages 
returning results that lack clinical validity and clinical utility; much of 
the debate focuses on results whose uncertain meaning and im-
portance is the reason for the research.”127  It is difficult to find bio-
ethicists who advocate return of all results including those that have 
uncertain accuracy or significance,128 even if appropriate disclaimers 
are made and even if the research participant desires the infor-
mation. 
Free-speech advocates also might be concerned that restrictions 
on the return of results inhibit political advocacy by gene-based 
communities.  Sharon Terry notes that granting people access to 
their genetic test information stimulates curiosity and participation129 
and it fosters social networks among people who share particular 
genes.130  People who have a gene variant may enjoy associating with 
other people who carry that same variant even if its medical signifi-
cance is presently unknown.  “[R]esults that are common to the 
community could challenge the community’s sense of who it is. This 
could be true in an ethnic or geographic community as well as dis-
ease-based community.”131 
Networks of people who share particular gene variants are a fo-
rum for elaborating non-medical meanings of the human genome 
(for example, if members of a gene-based community discover that 
they fancy the poetry of Ezra Pound more than other people do).  
This search for non-medical meaning probably qualifies as harmless 
fun.  Where bioethicists grow concerned is when gene-based com-
munities of laypeople presume to speculate about the genome’s med-
ical significance.  Terry mentions cases where communities of lay-
people have asserted scientifically dubious associations between genes 
and cystic fibrosis severity or have advocated novel, unsubstantiated 
treatments or concluded that gene variants cause symptoms that, to 
date, have no known association with the genes the people have.132  
Bioethicists and scientists express concern about letting laypeople 
learn from each other and elaborate community beliefs about the 
genome,133 especially if the beliefs are medical in nature. 
 
sults related to reproductive risks, personal meaning or utility, or health risks” subject to 
various conditions). 
127 See Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 231 (footnote omitted). 
128 Wolf, supra note 37, at 445. 
129 Terry, supra note 112, at 700. 
130 Id. at 714 (exploring how test results impact community identity and norms). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 714–15. 
133 Id. at 715–16. 
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Gene-based communities do not always take medicine into their 
own hands.  Instead, they sometimes become forceful advocates for 
mainstream research, but even this role can be controversial.  Their 
advocacy efforts may include petitioning the government to make 
public funds available to study their gene of interest134 or developing 
private resources for research via fundraising, biobanking, and other 
efforts within the affected community.  One community-driven effort 
of this latter sort began in the late 1980s, when carriers of mutations 
in the gene associated with Canavan disease worked together to col-
lect biospecimens and funds and enlisted investigators to study the 
genetic basis of that disease.135  A disagreement over the goals of ge-
netic research ultimately devolved into litigation when the investiga-
tors patented discoveries against the wishes of the Canavan communi-
ty, which would have preferred to keep discoveries in the public 
domain.136 
The return of results is an intensely private conversation between 
an investigator and a research subject yet, as Professor Post has noted, 
“[T]here is no reason why public opinion might not be formed one 
conversation at a time.”137  Individuals who discover they have a gene 
variant of unknown clinical significance may organize themselves to 
press for research to clarify its meaning.  Yet such communities can 
form only if people know they possess specific genes.  Banning the re-
turn of genetic test results that lack clinical significance impedes 
community formation and stifles this form of community-driven ad-
vocacy.  Letting people learn which genes they have empowers them 
to participate more effectively in the national debate about science 
policy.  Suppressing the return of uncertain or non-clinically-
significant genetic test results has the effect of excluding such people, 
even if this is not a conscious objective. 
 
134 See generally REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS SALVATION:  PATIENT ADVOCACY AND 
RESEARCH ETHICS 5 (2001) (“Today, more than ever, biomedical research is a public af-
fair . . . . A new breed of patient advocate sits at the table with scientists and policymakers, 
setting research agendas, planning studies, and considering how study results should af-
fect clinical practice.”). 
135 See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (S.D. Fla. 2003) 
(discussing these efforts). 
136 Id. 
137 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM:  A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 46 (2012); see also id. (discussing how private dis-
cussions between individuals and healthcare providers may cause individuals to support 
legislation affecting the availability of specific treatments and noting that as long as 
knowledge is potentially relevant to the formation of public opinion, there is no reason in 
principle why it should constitutionally matter whether it is distributed to one individual 
or to a thousand). 
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Some in the research community may feel that scientists and med-
ical professionals should decide which parts of the genome are worth 
studying, without the interference of pesky genetic community advo-
cates petitioning their government to fund a study of this or that 
gene first.  Even if this view has possible merits, it does not comport 
with our nation’s Constitution.  Given the limitations of the federal 
research budget, which genes to study in which order is a matter of 
public concern.  All citizens—even scientifically naïve ones—have the 
right to petition their government on matters of public concern.138 
Policies to suppress the return of non-clinically-significant genetic 
test results implicitly presume that a society can reach optimal deci-
sions about which genes to study if its citizens are kept behind a “veil 
of ignorance”139 so that ordinary citizens, not knowing their own 
genes, are unsure which lines of genetic research would benefit 
themselves.140  Public ignorance, it might be argued, clears the field 
for dispassionate decision-making by the learned keepers of the hu-
man genome.  The principle of better policy through public igno-
rance enjoys perennial support—not specifically here but in many 
different policy contexts—but it is inconsistent with the First 
Amendment. 
B.  Prior Censorship of Return of Results 
Even commentators who support the return of results may call for 
such conversations to be subject to prior review and regulation by 
IRBs or other ethics bodies.141  Such proposals display a willingness to 
suppress the speech of investigators whose utterances do not conform 
to an ethics review board’s concept of what is ethical.142  A recent ex-
ample was the 2011 advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
 
138 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievanc-
es.”). 
139 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 24, 136–42 (1971). 
140 Id. at 136–37 (“[Under the veil of ignorance, people] do not know how the various alter-
natives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles 
solely on the basis of general considerations.”). 
141 See, e.g., Bookman et al., supra note 117, at 1037 (“The decision to report genetic results 
should not depend solely on the discretion of the investigator, but should include a 
broader range of perspectives as is found in Institutional Review Boards.”); Fabsitz et al., 
supra note 39, at 575 (calling for IRB review as a condition of discretionary return of re-
sults by investigators); Holm & Taylor, supra note 121, at 672–73 (describing use of an In-
formed Cohort Oversight Board to oversee return of results); Maschke, supra note 120, at 
569–70 (describing various forms of ethics bodies used to oversee return of results from 
research in biospecimen repositories). 
142 See supra note 141. 
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(“ANPRM”), in which HHS proposed that research with biospeci-
mens should receive prior IRB review when results are going to be re-
turned, even if the research otherwise would be “excused” from IRB 
review under the Common Rule.143  This proposal, still not imple-
mented as of this writing, displays a mentality that speech between in-
vestigators and participants is intrinsically perilous, triggering a need 
for prior review.  The bioethics literature has not adequately ex-
plored whether such speech restrictions are themselves ethically or 
legally problematic. 
In an article that otherwise emphasized respect for participants’ 
personhood and preferences to receive results, Holm and Taylor 
found it unproblematic to interpose an Informed Cohort Oversight 
Board (“ICOB”) to assess “what information can be effectively com-
municated in a manner sensitive to subjects’ health literacy.”144  The 
ICOB, as described, seems very caring and deeply committed to pro-
tecting the interests of the research participants.  Yet to have an ex-
ternal body, even a benevolent one, censor communications and tai-
lor flows of information to each person’s perceived “literacy” has 
disturbing aspects that elicit concern in other communication con-
texts.145 
The literacy of laypeople is not much admired in the bioethics lit-
erature:  “Participant literacy, or lack thereof, causes a great deal of 
tension in the system.”146  “A 1993 study, repeated with the same re-
sults in 2002, showed that forty-seven percent of U.S. adults ‘lack the 
literacy skills needed to meet the demands of twenty-first century so-
ciety.’”147  If these statistics are true, does it follow that there is a bio-
ethical imperative to limit what such people can be told?  Speech re-
strictions seem an ill-fitting response to the problem of public 
illiteracy.  Walling illiterate people off from communication seems 
unlikely to cure their illiteracy. 
 
143 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Human Subjects Research Protections:  Enhancing 
Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Inves-
tigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,514–15 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 
46, 160, 164 and 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56). 
144 Holm & Taylor, supra note 121, at 672–73. 
145 Indeed, it is alarming to treat any right (even ones that do not relate to communication) 
as a function of literacy.  Thus literacy tests were abolished long ago as a precondition of 
voter registration, mainly because of their use as an instrument of discrimination.  Alt-
hough literacy no doubt does help make a person a better-informed and more effective 
voter, illiterate people still have rights among which the right to vote is one of the most 
important. 
146 Terry, supra note 112, at 709. 
147 Id. (citing INST. OF MEDICINE OF THE NAT’L ACAD., HEALTH LITERACY:  A PRESCRIPTION TO 
END CONFUSION 146 (Lynn Nielsen-Bohlman et al. eds., 2004)). 
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C.  Examples of Proposed Restrictions 
In its 1999 report, NBAC called for IRBs to develop guidelines for 
return of results and specified that “these guidelines should reflect 
the presumption that the disclosure of research results to subjects 
represents an exceptional circumstance.”148  NBAC recommended 
that results be returned “only when” the results are “scientifically val-
id and confirmed,” and “have significant implications for the sub-
ject’s health concerns,” and “a course of action to ameliorate those 
concerns is readily available.”149  NBAC’s “only when” language lends 
itself to two possible interpretations.  One interpretation is that if the 
conditions are not met, the investigator need not return results (i.e., 
there is no duty).  The alternative interpretation is that if the condi-
tions are not met, the investigator should not return results.  This lat-
ter interpretation entails content-based suppression of investigators’ 
speech. 
As noted earlier, much of the bioethics literature has focused on 
whether there is a duty for investigators to return research results.  
Concluding that there is no duty to return results is not the same 
thing as asserting that there is no right to do so.  Unfortunately, the 
literature often fails to specify whether it is discussing the duty or the 
right to return results.  Statements like NBAC’s recommendation to 
return results “only when”150 certain conditions are met have led 
many IRBs and commentators to conclude that speech bans may be 
warranted when those conditions are not met.  The notion that 
speech bans are appropriate implicitly presumes that there is no right 
for investigators and research subjects to engage in such communica-
tion. 
A 2008 article by Wolf et al. similarly seems to advocate content-
based restrictions on the return of research results.151  This article de-
lineates “when incidental findings should be returned, may be re-
turned, and should not be returned.”152  It recommends that a 
“[r]esearcher should not disclose IFs offering unlikely net benefit from 
 
148 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 72.  But see Terry, supra note 112, at 726 (suggest-
ing that NBAC’s view may now be out-of-date, particularly in view of the quality and rele-
vance of data from whole genome sequencing, which requires clear disclosure policies). 
149 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 72. 
150 Id. 
151 Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 219, 235 (stating, in the 2008 study’s recommendations, “Do 
not disclose” to research participants “information revealing a condition that is not likely to be 
of serious health or reproductive importance” or “information whose likely health or reproductive 
importance cannot be ascertained”). 
152 Wolf, supra note 37, at 441 (summarizing the findings of the 2008 study by Wolf et al., 
supra note 42). 
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the participant’s perspective, including ‘information whose likely 
health or reproductive importance cannot be ascertained.’”153  The 
use of “should not” rather than “need not” suggests that this article is 
not merely noting the absence of a duty to discuss results that lack 
clinical or reproductive significance.  It appears to be advocating con-
tent-based restrictions on investigators’ speech.  On close reading, 
however, the article acknowledges that “[t]here is a distinct debate on 
returning research information at the request of research partici-
pants.”154  Thus, the article may not have intended to express any 
opinion about the investigator’s right to discuss results with a willing 
research participant.  Yet the “should not” language does seem to 
contemplate banning or restricting certain types of speech. 
In an influential 2006 article155 that reported recommendations of 
the NHLBI Working Group on Reporting Genetic Results in Re-
search Studies, Bookman et al. discussed whether (and when) inves-
tigators have a duty to offer the return of research results.156  This ar-
ticle also noted that there is a “strong voice that supports the right of 
participants to receive results that may be clinically useful.”157  This 
discussion of participants’ rights and investigators’ duties did not, howev-
er, explore investigators’ rights to communicate results to participants 
who wish to receive them. 
A separate NHLBI-sponsored working group paper in 2010 found 
a duty to return results that have “important health implications” 
when the risks are “established and substantial” and when the results 
are “actionable” in the sense that there are established therapies or 
preventive actions that could improve the clinical outcome.158  This 
duty would exist only if “[t]he test is analytically valid, and the disclo-
sure plan complies with all applicable laws” and if the subject has 
consented to the return of results.159  In situations where there is no 
duty to return results, the NHLBI paper allowed that an investigator 
“may choose” to return results if “all of the following apply”: 
a. The investigator has concluded that the potential benefits of disclo-
sure outweigh the risks from the participant’s perspective. 
b. The investigator’s IRB has approved the disclosure plan. 
 
153 See Wolf et al., supra note 43, at 372 (summarizing results of the 2008 study by Wolf et al., 
supra note 42). 
154 Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 227 (emphasis omitted). 
155 Bookman et al., supra note 117. 
156 Id. at 1038–39 (discussing circumstances under which genetic results “should” be offered 
to research participants). 
157 Id. at 1035. 
158 Fabsitz et al, supra note 39, at 575. 
159 Id. 
Feb. 2014] RIGHT TO SPEAK ABOUT THE HUMAN GENOME 579 
 
c. The test is analytically valid and the disclosure plan complies with all 
applicable laws. 
d.  [and the participant has consented to the return of information].160 
These conditions still place significant burdens on the return of re-
sults.  For example, the return of results would be subject to prior 
IRB review, and investigators and participants would not be permit-
ted to discuss the results of tests having uncertain analytical validity 
even if the uncertainty is forthrightly disclosed.  The NHLBI paper is 
somewhat unusual, however, in the breadth of information it would 
allow investigators to return.161  Subject to the conditions just listed, it 
would grant them discretion to return “results related to reproductive 
risks, personal meaning or utility, or health risks,” although some 
members of the NHLBI working group dissented on the matter of 
whether personal meaning to the participant is a proper basis for re-
turn.162 
It is clear that bioethical perspectives on the return of results disa-
gree on many nuances and particulars, but the bioethical literature 
displays fairly broad support for the following proposition:  speech 
restrictions that suppress the return of results may be justified when 
the findings (1) are uncertain or are of questionable analytical validi-
ty,163 (2) lack a well-established clinical validity or reproductive signifi-
cance,164 or (3) lack clinical utility/actionability.165  To facilitate fur-
 
160 Id. at 577–78.  The bracketed passage here summarizes a longer discussion in the origi-
nal. 
161 Id.; see also Holm & Taylor, supra note 121, at 671 (arguing that the personal meaning of 
genomic information and patient preferences should inform decisions about return of 
results).  But see id. at 675 (discussing efforts to address the fact that within The Gene 
Partnership, the primary results eligible for potential disclosure would not be known clin-
ical variants incidentally discovered, but instead would be new and uncertain discover-
ies—novel variants, or novel understandings). 
162 Fabsitz et al., supra note 39, at 578. 
163 See, e.g., 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71 (“[M]ost [experts] believe that find-
ings should not be conveyed unless they are confirmed and reliable and constitute clini-
cally significant or scientifically relevant information.”); Parker, supra note 20, at 452 (“It 
is generally, though not uniformly, agreed that unreliable results ought not be offered 
back to individuals.”); Wolf, supra note 37, at 446 (“[W]e see a near-universal demand for 
analytical validity as a precondition for informational return.”); see also Holm & Taylor, 
supra note 121, at 676 (supporting disclosure of information even if its clinical signifi-
cance is uncertain but requiring that it be analytically valid). 
164 See, e.g., 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71; Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 235 
(summarizing various recommendations); see also Maschke, supra note 120, at 559 (citing 
the fact that most genetic research results have uncertain clinical significance as a reason 
why many biobanks adopt a “no-return” policy).  But see id. at 559–60 (noting that some 
commentators contend that persons who contribute biospecimens for research should 
have access to genetic test results even if the information is of uncertain clinical signifi-
cance). 
165 See Wolf et al., supra note 42, at 231. 
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ther analysis of this proposition, this Article will refer to it as the “cau-
tious” approach insofar as it seeks to restrict the communication of 
genetic information to the individuals whose genomes are involved. 
D.  Ethical Justifications for Suppressing the Return of Results 
Bioethicists cite various concerns that justify restricting the return 
of results.  Table 1 shows a sampling of these justifications.  Some eth-
icists challenge whether returning results has value as a form of 
communication.  Other ethicists are concerned that returning results 
may inflict various types of harm on participants and, potentially, on 
their families and genetically similar communities.  There also is con-
cern that returning results may cause broader social and economic 
harms to the public. 
TABLE 1 
ETHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RESTRICTING THE RETURN OF RESULTS 
 
CHALLENGES TO THE VALUE OF THE COMMUNICATION 
1. Individual findings are not “information” worth communicating.  
“[P]reliminary results do not yet constitute ‘information’ since ‘until an 
initial finding is confirmed, there is no reliable information’ to com-
municate to subjects . . . .’”166 
 
2. Returning results is ineffective:  even if participants are not harmed by it, they 
may fail to gain any benefits.  Returning results may fail to help people 
manage their health risks, because genetic risk is not an effective motiva-
tor of behavioral change.167 
CONCERNS ABOUT LISTENER VULNERABILITY 
3. Returning results may expose participants to anxiety.  Returning results could 
cause participants to experience anxiety about their test results.168  In sit-
 
166 See 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71–72 (citing Charles R. MacKay, Ethical Issues 
in Research Design and Conduct:  Developing a Test to Detect Carriers of Huntington’s Disease, 6 
IRB 1, 3 (1984)). 
167 Parker, supra note 20, at 468–69. 
168 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71; Parker, supra note 20, at 470 (noting con-
cerns about psychological impacts); Terry, supra note 112, at 713 (noting anxiety associ-
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uations where people’s biospecimens have been studied without their 
consent, returning results could further upset them by making them 
aware that their specimens were used in research without their 
knowledge.169 
 
4. Participants may misunderstand their results.  There is thought to be a high 
risk that participants will misconstrue the meaning of their genetic test 
results.170  Laypeople may fail to appreciate the uncertainty of research 
results and are prone to therapeutic misconception (the belief that re-
search results are more useful for clinical purposes than the results actu-
ally are).171  “[E]ven . . . confirmed findings may have some unforeseen 
limitations.’”172 
 
5. Returning results may cause participants to make bad healthcare decisions that 
harm them.  Returning results could cause unnecessary (and possibly 
harmful) medical interventions.173 
 
6. Returning results exposes participants to the risk of stigmatization or discrimina-
tion.  Telling people their test results may place them at risk of stigmati-
zation or discrimination in employment or insurance.174  Communicating 
genetic information to one individual may have impacts on genetically 
similar family members and population groups, possibly subjecting them 
to adverse impacts.175 
 
7. Participants’ preferences to receive return of results may not reflect what they actu-
ally want.  Participants’ expressed preferences to receive their test results 
may be unreliable,176 unstable over time,177 based on false beliefs178 or 
 
ated with learning about risks, but indicating that some studies suggest that this effect is 
less than previously thought). 
169 Maschke, supra note 120, at 563. 
170 See Holm & Taylor, supra note 121, at 670 (“[C]ommunicating genomic research results 
has historically been opposed, by some, based on an assumption that therapeutic miscon-
ceptions are inevitable, that harm necessarily flows from a misconception and is unpre-
ventable and incurable, and that such harm necessarily outweighs any potential benefit, 
regardless of how benefit might be conceived or measured.” (citing Kohane & Taylor, su-
pra note 112, at 1–2)). 
171 See, e.g., Terry, supra note 112, 720–21; see also id. at 709 (discussing a study that found 
that forty-seven percent of people lack the basic scientific “literacy” necessary for life in a 
twenty-first-century society). 
172 See 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 71–72 (quoting MacKay, supra note 166, at 3) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
173 Id. at 71. 
174 Terry, supra note 112, at 712. 
175 1 NBAC, 1999 REPORT, supra note 47, at 72–73. 
176 Parker, supra note 20, at 475–477. 
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misunderstandings about the uncertainty of results,179 or may be irra-
tional and ill-informed.180 
CONCERNS ABOUT BROADER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HARMS TO THE PUBLIC 
8. Returning results may cause participants to over-consume follow-up healthcare 
services.  Returning results creates increased demand for follow-up care 
and places burdens on scarce healthcare resources as participants seek to 
clarify the impact of their genes.181 
 
9. The cost of returning results may harm the research enterprise.  The high cost of 
returning results could reduce the availability of funds for research.182  
Note, however, that much of the perceived cost comes from the cautious 
view’s insistence that only high-quality, confirmed results should be re-
turned.  This insistence entails significant investment to enhance certain-
ty prior to return of results. 
 
10. Participants may corrupt genetic understanding as they attempt to decipher the 
meaning of their test results.  After receiving results, participants may draw 
scientifically invalid conclusions based on blogs and other postings in 
communities formed by laypeople who share particular genes.183  Com-
munity beliefs may supplant valid science and propagate inaccurate “dis-
ease legends.”184 
 
The concerns listed in Table 1 may supply ethical justification for 
suppressing the return of results, assuming of course that there is no 
ethical objection to the paternalism implicit in keeping participants 
uninformed for their own good.185  Yet ethical justification and legal 
justification are two different things.  Even if speech restrictions are 
ethically justified, it may not be constitutional to enact speech re-
strictions into law.  For example, impolite remarks can be highly un-
 
177 See id. at 474; see also Terry, supra note 112, at 706 (“[P]ersonal preferences can change 
throughout the life course due to many circumstances.”); cf. Holm & Taylor, supra note 
121, at 676 (“[Some commentators express] skepticism about whether preferences are ac-
tually durable, known by, and ascertainable from participants.”). 
178 See Parker, supra note 20, at 461. 
179 See id. at 463. 
180 See id. at 466. 
181 See Terry, supra note 112, at 723. 
182 See Parker, supra note 20, at 467 ; cf. Jewell, supra note 119, at 664. 
183 See Terry, supra note 112, at 715. 
184 Id. at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
185 See Parker, supra note 20, at 480 (“[P]aternalistic understanding of individuals’ well-being 
can be justified in the context of research, even genomic research.”). 
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ethical, but a law banning impolite speech almost surely would violate 
the First Amendment.  If the speech restrictions bioethicists recom-
mend were imposed by force of law, it is not clear they would be con-
stitutional.  The remainder of this Article explores whether laws and 
regulations restricting the return of results can be legally, as well as 
ethically, justified. 
III.  THE LEGAL VIEW OF SPEECH RESTRICTIONS 
The field of law has had a sustained engagement with problems 
related to the suppression of free speech.  Use of the First Amend-
ment to protect free speech is of relatively recent origin, tracing to a 
series of opinions Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in 1919.186  
Courts have subsequently decided many cases involving First 
Amendment protection of speech and there is a large scholarly litera-
ture on the subject. 
The fact that bioethicists sometimes espouse speech restrictions as 
a tool of human-subject protection may reflect historical factors.  First 
Amendment doctrine continued to evolve after the 1970s, but mod-
ern research bioethics rests heavily on concepts and principles elabo-
rated in the 1970s era.  The National Research Act of 1974187 estab-
lished a National Commission188 that oversaw development of the 
Belmont Report,189 published in 1979, which identifies ethical princi-
ples that continue to animate research bioethics.  In 1978, this com-
mission also enunciated a set of regulatory recommendations to be 
reflected in the Common Rule.190  For much of the twentieth century, 
 
186 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 2353, 2356–59 (2000) (discussing Justice Holmes’s development of First Amend-
ment law in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), and Abrams v. United States, 50 U.S. 
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
187 National Research Act of 1974 (National Research Service Award Act of 1974), Pub. L. 
No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
188 See Pub. L. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342, § 201 (enacting 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1, the precursor of to-
day’s 42 U.S.C. § 300v-1, creating the National Commission and describing its role in de-
veloping substantive standards of human subject protection); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
EDUC. & WELFARE, PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS:  INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS:  
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174 (Nov. 
30, 1978) [hereinafter HEW, 1978 REPORT] (discussing the National Commission and re-
porting its findings). 
189 BELMONT REPORT, supra note 111, at 23,192. 
190 HEW, 1978 REPORT, supra note 188,  at 56,175–83; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300v-1(b) (requir-
ing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to consider and respond to recommen-
dations of the National Commission and a successor commission when establishing the 
Common Rule’s substantive standards of human subject protection). 
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including well into the 1970s as this work was underway, the Supreme 
Court viewed health care as having a special status that justified heavy 
regulation, including speech restrictions, to promote health and safe-
ty interests:  “When public and private actors invoked health con-
cerns to justify their conduct, the Court often expressed less skepti-
cism than when other reasons were invoked for public and private 
conduct.”191 
This special status of health care eroded in subsequent decades.192  
A crucial event in its erosion was the emergence of the commercial 
speech doctrine, which limits the regulation of speech even in health-
related contexts.  The Supreme Court enunciated this doctrine in a 
1976 case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc.193  That decision struck down a state law that prohibited 
advertising of prescription drug prices, and the doctrine continued to 
evolve from that starting point.194  The foundations of modern hu-
man-subject protections trace back to an era when policymakers pre-
sumed it was legally unproblematic to suppress speech to promote 
health and safety objectives.  That presumption has changed, but the 
field of bioethics has failed to change with it.  The bioethical debate 
about return of results at times seems out of touch with current First 
Amendment realities. 
A.  Brief Summary of the First Amendment Framework 
First Amendment doctrine recognizes three categories of speech, 
with the degree of First Amendment protection a particular commu-
nication receives depending on which category of speech is involved.  
The first category (“regulable speech”) includes various types of 
communication that lie largely outside of First Amendment protec-
tion and can be regulated by the government, whether through state 
or federal statutes and regulations or through state common law 
(e.g., tort lawsuits).  Scholars disagree about the breadth of speech 
 
191 David Orentlicher, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation:  The Clash Between the 
Public Interest in a Robust First Amendment and the Public Interest in Effective Protection from 
Harm, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 299, 300 (2012). 
192 See id. at 302 (noting that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts are increasingly 
willing to challenge public health justifications for limitations on individual liberties). 
193 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
194 See Coleen Klasmeier & Martin Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the 
First Amendment:  A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 
315, 339–41 (2012) (discussing the strengthening of commercial speech doctrine in the 
years after 1976). 
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activity that is regulable.195  This disagreement is largely immaterial to 
this discussion because common candidates for regulable speech—
things like “defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography 
produced with real children”196—obviously have nothing to do with 
the return of genetic test results.  Two categories of speech regulation 
are, however, potentially relevant to this discussion and will be exam-
ined in greater detail below.  These are:  (1) professional speech—
that is, the speech that lawyers, doctors, and other licensed profes-
sionals provide to clients and patients in the course of providing pro-
fessional services,197 and (2) speech regulation—particularly, regula-
tion of health claims—that occurs pursuant to consumer-product 
safety and other health and safety regulations.198 
The second category is commercial speech, which enjoys a meas-
ure of First Amendment protection199 although the government has a 
constrained (but still considerable) power to regulate it.200  Commer-
cial speech has been described as “speech proposing a commercial 
transaction”201 or “speech . . . related to the economic interests of the 
 
195 See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other “Abridgements” of Scientific Re-
search:  The Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment, 54 EMORY L.J. 979, 1009 
(2005) (“The Court has generally taken an ‘all-inclusive’ approach . . . asserting that all 
speech receives First Amendment protection unless it falls with[in] certain narrow cate-
gories of expression . . . .”); see also, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Trouble with “Public Discourse” 
as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567, 584, 591 (2011) (noting that the 
“all-inclusive approach” (or, more precisely, the “presumptive all-inclusive approach”) is 
the approach the Court has generally set forth, though with some exceptions, and noting 
that, at times, the exceptions are over-counted by separately counting various legal sce-
narios that all share a common feature, e.g., that there is no constitutional protection of 
false statements of fact).  But see James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Val-
ue of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 492 (2011) (“[H]ighly protected 
speech is the exception, with most other speech being regulable because of its content 
with no discernible First Amendment constraint . . . .”). 
196 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002). 
197 See Post, supra note 56, at 947–48 (discussing the regulation of speech by physicians and 
dentists). 
198 See Orentlicher, supra note 191, at 299 (noting that the government historically was 
granted more leeway to regulate speech for the purpose of safeguarding public health 
than for advancing other state interests). 
199 See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (“[C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited 
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate positions in the scale of First 
Amendment values . . . .” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 
(1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
200 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (“Although commer-
cial speech is protected by the First Amendment, not all regulation of such speech is un-
constitutional.”); see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2000) (noting the subordinate status of commercial speech and the 
government’s ability to regulate it). 
201 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 
455–56) (internal quotation marks omitted); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 
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speaker and its audience,”202 and it includes such things as advertis-
ing,203 creating and disseminating health records as part of a data-
mining business,204 and making health claims about a product (for 
example, claiming that a vitamin prevents cancer or reduces the risk 
of neural tube defects).205 
The third category is pure speech206 (also called noncommercial 
speech, core First Amendment speech, or fully protected speech) 
that receives the most robust constitutional protection.  Scholars dis-
agree about the precise scope of fully protected speech,207 but there is 
general agreement that it includes, at the very least, such things as 
political speech—“[d]iscussion of public issues”208 and the “unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and so-
cial changes desired by the people”209—as well as artistic expression 
and scholarly and scientific debate.210 
Concerns raised earlier in this Article hint at the possibility that 
the return of results may include elements of core First Amendment 
 
471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
202 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (citing Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 
203 Id. 
204 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (“[T]he creation and dissemi-
nation of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”). 
205 See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying com-
mercial speech doctrine in a First Amendment challenge to FDA restrictions on health 
claims that dietary supplements and food fiber can reduce the risks of certain cancers and 
neural tube defects); Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2, 7 (D.D.C. 2002) (ap-
plying commercial speech doctrine in a First Amendment challenge to FDA restrictions 
on claims that anti-oxidants reduce the risk of cancer); Alliance for Natural Health US v. 
Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 60–61 (D.D.C. 2010) (applying commercial speech doctrine 
in a First Amendment challenge to FDA restrictions on claims concerning selenium and 
cancer); Alliance for Natural Health US v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(applying commercial speech doctrine in a challenge to FDA restrictions on claims that 
vitamins C and E prevent cancer). 
206 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 60 (D.D.C. 1998) (con-
trasting the First Amendment frameworks for pure speech and commercial speech), va-
cated on other grounds, Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
207 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 195, at 567 (arguing that labels such as “public discourse” and 
“speech on matters of public concern” are not adequate for delimiting the range of 
speech that is protected by the First Amendment); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free 
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 625–29 (1982) (exploring the normative position that all 
human expression should receive First Amendment protection). 
208 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
209 Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
210 See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (noting that scientific and academic speech is entitled to 
the highest level of First Amendment protection). 
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speech.211  While this may be true, the analysis that follows will rely 
primarily on the commercial speech doctrine.  This reflects a prag-
matic choice about study design:  the goal here is to test whether the 
First Amendment protects the communication that occurs when an 
investigator returns results to a research participant.  The more rig-
orous test of this hypothesis is to analyze the return of results under 
the assumption that it is merely commercial speech, if indeed it is 
constitutionally protected at all.  If the commercial speech doctrine 
protects this communication, then it would be all the more protected 
if return of results were conceived as core First Amendment speech.  
The reliance on commercial speech analysis is thus the more strin-
gent and skeptical way to test this Article’s hypothesis. 
B.  Protection of Commercial Speech 
Until 1976, the Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment 
as placing no constraint on the government’s ability to regulate 
commercial speech.212  Since that time, commercial speech has re-
ceived a measure of First Amendment protection.  Early commercial 
speech cases referred to this as a “limited measure of protection”213 to 
emphasize that commercial speech holds a “subordinate position in 
the scale of First Amendment values.”214  In a recent case, Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc.,215 the Supreme Court at times seemed to suggest that 
commercial speech has parity with pure (noncommercial) speech 
but, in fact, the Court did not announce a new standard for protect-
ing commercial speech and ultimately decided the case using the 
same analytical framework it has been using in commercial speech 
cases for over thirty years.  This framework is called the Central Hud-
son test,216 named for the 1980 case Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
 
211 See discussion supra notes 18–36 and notes 123–37 and accompanying text. 
212 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,762 
(1976) (recognizing a degree of constitutional protection for commercial speech); see also 
Post, supra note 200, at 2. 
213 Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)(emphasis added) (“[C]ommercial speech 
[enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in 
the scale of First Amendment values . . . .” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 
U.S. 447, 456 (1978))).  
214 Id. 
215 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
216 Id. at 2667–68 (deciding the case under standards enunciated in Cenral. Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), which are associated 
with commercial speech cases and are less strict than the tests courts apply in cases involv-
ing core First Amendment speech); see also id. at 2667 (“[T]he outcome is the same 
whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is ap-
plied.”). 
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v. Public Service Commission of New York217 that first enunciated it.  After 
courts determine that a communication is commercial speech, they 
use the four-step Central Hudson test to analyze whether laws regulat-
ing that speech are constitutional. 
At Step One, courts ask whether the speech is non-misleading and 
concerns lawful activity.218  If the speech is found to be misleading or 
relates to an illegal activity, that is the end of the analysis:  the speech 
is not entitled to any constitutional protection and the government 
may regulate it.219  If, on the other hand, the speech is non-misleading 
and is not about an unlawful activity, the speech is eligible for consti-
tutional protection.220  The government still may be able to regulate 
the speech, but the regulations must satisfy three constraints.  The 
remainder of the Central Hudson test focuses not on the speech, but 
on the specific regulation that is the subject of the First Amendment 
challenge.  Steps Two–Four of the Central Hudson test check that the 
regulation satisfies each of the three constraints. 
At Step Two, courts ask whether the government’s asserted inter-
est in regulating the speech is “substantial.”221  Unless the government 
asserts an important reason for regulating commercial speech, courts 
will find the regulation unconstitutional at this step in the analysis. 
Assuming the government has enunciated a substantial interest 
that it is trying to protect, courts move to Step Three, which asks 
whether the regulation directly advances that interest.222  If regulating 
commercial speech only will have a tenuous or indirect impact on the 
problem the government is trying to solve, courts will find the regula-
tion unconstitutional at this step in the analysis. 
Finally, if the regulation passed the earlier tests, courts move to 
Step Four and ask whether the regulation is more extensive than is 
necessary to serve the interest.223  For example, did the regulation ban 
speech altogether when requiring a warning or disclosure would have 
solved the problem?  Even if the government is trying to protect an 
important interest, and even if the regulation contributes in a positive 
way to the government’s objective, the regulation still will be uncon-
 
217 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64, 566 (striking down regulations that banned promo-
tional advertising by utility companies even though the state claimed that the ban would 
encourage energy conservation and prevent inequities in utility rates). 
218 Id. at 566. 
219 Id. at 563–64. 
220 Id. at 564–65. 
221 Id. at 566. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
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stitutional if the regulation has a more draconian impact on free 
speech than was necessary. 
This overview of the Central Hudson test raises a number of practi-
cal questions in the context of return of results.  For example, what 
does it mean for speech to be misleading?  Does returning a genetic 
test result to a person who failed eighth-grade biology count as mis-
leading speech?  If the CLIA regulations require labs to be CLIA-
certified in order to return results, would returning results from a 
non-CLIA-certified lab be speech “related to unlawful activity”?224  
What types of government interests count as substantial?  What does 
it mean for a regulation to advance the government’s interest directly 
and be no more extensive than necessary?  The best way to answer 
these questions is with examples of how the Central Hudson test has 
been applied in relevant court cases that raised issues similar to those 
encountered in returning results. 
Before turning to that task, Table 2 shows the range of outcomes 
that can occur under this test.  The Central Hudson test grants the 
government considerable leeway to regulate commercial speech.  The 
government can, for example, require speakers to make disclosures 
or it can impose prior restraints on what can be communicated (for 
example, by requiring statements to be backed by scientific evi-
dence).225  A well-designed, well-justified regulation of commercial 
speech can survive the four-factor analysis and be found constitution-
al.  As the Court noted in Sorrell v. IMS Health, “the government’s le-
gitimate interest in protecting consumers from commercial harms 
explains why commercial speech can be subject to greater govern-
mental regulation than noncommercial [pure] speech.”226  On the 
other hand, regulations that are poorly designed or inadequately jus-
tified will fail the test and be deemed unconstitutional.  Thus, com-
mercial speech may turn out to be regulable, if the regulation satisfies 
the Central Hudson criteria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
224 Id. at 564. 
225 See Post, supra note 200, at 1 (“[T]he state can compel disclosures, impose overbroad reg-
ulations, and establish prior restraints within the domain of commercial speech . . . .”). 
226 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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TABLE 2 
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES UNDER THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
 
MAY THE GOVERNMENT REGULATE THE 
SPEECH? 
 
Commercial speech that is 
misleading or related to an 
unlawful activity 
 
Yes.  Regulations that restrict this speech 
are constitutional.  This speech is ineligible 
for constitutional protection and is regula-
ble speech.  
 
Commercial speech that is 
neither misleading nor related 
to an unlawful activity 
 
Yes, if the regulation meets certain criteria.  This 
speech is eligible for constitutional protec-
tion but it nevertheless can be regulated 
provided that the government has a substan-
tial interest and the regulation directly ad-
vances that interest and is no more exten-
sive than it needs to be.  Regulations that 
meet these criteria are constitutional and 
the commercial speech in question is regu-
lable. 
 
No, if the regulation fails to meet the criteria.  
This speech is eligible for constitutional 
protection, and regulations that fail to 
meet the criteria just described are uncon-
stitutional.  The speech is protected by the 
First Amendment. 
 
IV.  IS RETURN OF RESULTS PROTECTED AS COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH? 
 
Investigators who return genetic test results do so gratis for the 
perceived benefit of research participants and, in many cases, the in-
vestigators are not even physicians who could supply the follow-up 
care that the participants may seek after learning their genetic test re-
sults.  Part IV.A explains why the return of results nevertheless has at-
tributes of commercial speech.  Then, Parts IV.B–IV.D draw on rele-
vant case law to apply the various steps of Central Hudson to the return 
of results.  Finally, Part IV.E explores whether the concept of regula-
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ble professional speech might justify placing restrictions on the re-
turn of results and concludes that it does not. 
A.  Why Return of Results Can Be Characterized as Commercial Speech 
If the return of results is in the nature of noncommercial (pure) 
speech, then it would be very hard to justify the restrictions that law 
and bioethics place on investigators’ communications with research 
participants.  The more stringent test of whether such restrictions are 
constitutional is to proceed under the hypothesis that return of re-
sults may merely be commercial speech.  This characterization is 
plausible for reasons discussed below. 
Return of results has promotional aspects.  Returning results promotes 
a commercial transaction.  The commercial transaction is the re-
search itself or, more specifically, the procurement of a critical input 
(research participants) for the research.  There is considerable evi-
dence suggesting that people’s willingness to contribute their bio-
specimens or otherwise volunteer for genetic research depends on 
whether they will receive return of results.227  One survey found that 
“[t]he most influential factor affecting the respondent’s willingness 
to participate in the study seemed to be the offer of individualized re-
sults.”228  Restricting investigators’ ability to return research results po-
tentially interferes with their ability to procure raw materials, such as 
biospecimens, for research.  Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman 
defined advertising as communications “emphasizing desirable quali-
ties so as to arouse a desire to buy or patronize.”229  Returning results 
emphasizes an aspect of research that many prospective participants 
find desirable:  the chance to learn about the genome including 
one’s own.  Such considerations need not be the sole motive, in order 
for return of results to have a promotional effect. 
A related question is whether federally funded genetic research is 
“commercial.”  Modern courts characterize research as a commercial 
activity unless it is “solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or 
for strictly philosophical inquiry”230—a standard that little if any NIH-
 
227 See Parker, supra note 20, at 471–72 (discussing various studies of participants’ prefer-
ences concerning return of results and whether return of results influenced their willing-
ness to volunteer for research); Terry, supra note 112, at 708–09 (noting that one study 
found that people’s willingness to contribute to a research biobank was tied to there be-
ing a binding agreement addressing return of results). 
228 Parker, supra note 20, at 472. 
229 Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 64 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing 
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1988)). 
230 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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funded genetic research is able to measure up to (or, perhaps, down 
to).  Research, including federally funded basic scientific research at 
academic institutions, has commercial aspects.231  Even when research 
does nothing more than increase the institution’s status or create 
learning opportunities for its students and faculty, the research “un-
mistakably further[s] the institution’s legitimate business objec-
tives.”232  After passage of the Bayh-Dole amendments,233 many institu-
tions reap direct commercial benefits by patenting discoveries from 
their federally funded research. 
Return of results is primarily informational rather than expressive speech.  
An investigator returning results to a research participant generally 
does so not as an act of personal self-expression but in order to in-
form the listener.  It is true that the act of returning results includes 
some expressive elements that convey an investigator’s point of view 
on matters of public concern.  For example, returning uncertain test 
results might express the investigators’ view that research participants 
are more intelligent and better able to grasp uncertainty than some 
IRBs and regulators give them credit for.  Returning results might 
express the investigator’s support for a shift to a participatory model 
of health care that disrupts the power of traditional intermediaries 
and gatekeepers.  It might even express a belief that laws restricting 
the return of results are bad policy deserving of civil disobedience.  
Thus, it cannot be denied that the return of results may include ele-
ments of pure (noncommercial) speech. 
That said, the return of results is primarily informational rather 
than expressive speech:  its goal is to convey information to the lis-
tener.  This fact is consistent with the view that it is commercial 
speech.  When commercial and pure (noncommercial) speech are 
inextricably intertwined, as they arguably may be in the context of re-
turning results, a strong case can be made for treating the entire 
communication as fully protected speech deserving the highest de-
gree of First Amendment protection.234  I do not, however, press that 
case here because, treating return of results as commercial speech 
provides a more rigorous test of this Article’s hypothesis.235 
 
231 See id. at 1362–63 (noting that research done by a university may increase the status of the 
institution and lure lucrative research grants, students, and faculty). 
232 Id. at 1362. 
233 For the Bayh-Dole amendments, see 35 U.S.C §§ 200–212 (2006). 
234 See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (discussing whether commercial and pure 
speech were inextricably intertwined, such that “the entirety must . . . be classified as 
noncommercial”). 
235 See discussion supra Introduction. 
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The commercial speech doctrine pays heed to the interests of lis-
teners.  American free speech doctrine tends to be speaker-oriented 
because the First Amendment protects rights of speakers rather than 
rights of listeners.236  The speaker’s right of self-expression is a major 
concern in many pure (noncommercial) speech contexts:  the First 
Amendment protects the right of speakers to associate themselves 
with particular political, religious, moral, or cultural viewpoints.  In 
contrast, the commercial speech doctrine often values speech for its 
informational function, as opposed to its expressive function.237  Valu-
ing speech for its informational content implicitly treats audience in-
terests as an important concern.238  “Commercial expression not only 
serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers 
and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination 
of information.”239  First Amendment protection of commercial 
speech rejects the “highly paternalistic” view that it benefits listeners 
to regulate or suppress speech and instead assumes that “people will 
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough in-
formed, and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of 
communication rather than to close them.”240 
Various modes of communication can qualify as “speech” for First 
Amendment purposes.  Sorrell v. IMS Health challenged a Vermont 
law that restricted data-mining companies’ ability to disseminate pre-
scriber-identifying pharmacy records for use in drug marketing and 
also restricted drug companies’ use of such records in drug detailing 
(marketing visits).241  The State of Vermont argued that it could regu-
late the sale of data because such sales are “conduct” rather than 
“speech.”242  The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that earlier cases 
have “held that the creation and dissemination of information are 
speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”243  In the same 
way, testing people’s genomes and telling them the results constitutes 
speech as well as conduct.  “Facts, after all, are the beginning point 
 
236 See Weinstein, supra note 195, at 498 (noting that American free speech doctrine focuses 
heavily on the rights of the speaker). 
237 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) 
(“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational 
function of advertising.”). 
238 Id.; see also Post, supra note 200, at 1 (“[C]ommercial speech is protected because of its 
informational function.”). 
239 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62. 
240 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
241 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). 
242 Id. at 2666. 
243 Id. at 2667. 
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for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human 
knowledge and to conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong ar-
gument that prescriber-identifying information is speech for First 
Amendment purposes.”244  By this same reasoning, genetic test results 
are speech.  The Supreme Court has commented that “[t]he First 
Amendment protects even dry information, devoid of advocacy, polit-
ical relevance, or artistic expression.  A restriction on disclosure is a 
regulation of speech.”245  In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Supreme Court 
noted that a listener’s “concern for the free flow of commercial 
speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political 
dialogue”246 and remarked, “That reality has great relevance in the 
fields of medicine and public health, where information can save 
lives.”247 
Return of results is speech involving health claims.  Return of results of-
ten includes health claims:  claims that a particular gene variant does 
or does not have a particular impact on human health.  Courts con-
sistently apply commercial speech doctrine in cases involving health 
claims.248  This body of case law is highly relevant to the return of re-
sults because health-claims cases frequently have forced courts to ana-
lyze the problem of listener vulnerability in contexts where speech 
conveys information that is scientifically complex or uncertain.  The 
relevant line of cases involved First Amendment challenges to regula-
tions that restrict the claims that manufacturers can make about their 
products.  Regulations restricting health and environmental claims 
typically take the form of evidentiary requirements:  before it is legal 
to make a claim, the claim must be scientifically validated according 
to specific evidentiary standards.249  A familiar example is the FDA 
 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 2666–67 (citing IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 2010) and 
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 445 (D. Vt. 2009)). 
246 Id. at 2664 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
247 Id. at 2664. 
248 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 61 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting 
that courts consistently apply commercial speech doctrine in health claims cases and 
providing a list of examples). 
249 See id. (citing examples of cases that involved challenges to regulations imposing eviden-
tiary requirements on health and environmental claims); see also Richard A. Samp, Courts 
Are Arriving at a Consensus on Food and Drug Administration Speech Regulation, 58 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 313, 314 (2003) (“[E]very major lawsuit challenging FDA speech restrictions 
has proceeded under the assumption that the speech in question is commercial in char-
acter.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nathan Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-Regulated 
Firms Ever Be Noncommercial?, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 388, 397 (2011) (indicating that a survey 
of case law as of 2012 continues to support Samp’s observation).  See generally health-
claims cases cited infra Part IV. 
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drug regulatory framework, which requires manufacturers to provide 
the agency with specific types of clinical evidence proving that a drug 
is safe and effective in its indicated uses before the drug can be la-
beled or promoted for those uses. 
As discussed earlier, there is a fair degree of consensus among bi-
oethicists that suppressing the return of results may be appropriate if 
the results are uncertain or lack analytical validity, clinical validity, 
and clinical utility/actionability.250  This cautious view is, in essence, 
an attempt to subject the return of results to health-claims regulation.  
This view would suppress the return of results that fail to meet partic-
ular standards of scientific evidence.  The relationship between a test 
analyte (such as a gene or other biomarker) and a particular health 
impact must be scientifically established before the analyte can be 
discussed with participants.  That amounts to health-claims regula-
tion. 
Regulating health claims puts a burden on free speech by sup-
pressing claims that fail to meet the required standard of evidence.  
Listener vulnerability is a possible rationale for imposing this burden.  
As bioethicists have noted, listeners may be unqualified to assess the 
validity of scientific claims or they may respond inappropriately to 
uncertain information.251  In such circumstances, it may make sense 
to appoint a regulator or other learned body to police the quality of 
claims that can be made.  Traditionally, regulators in the United 
States enjoyed wide latitude to use speech restrictions as a tool to 
promote health and safety objectives,252 and health-claims regulations 
were largely uncontroversial.  This began to change after the com-
mercial speech doctrine emerged in the late 1970s.253 
There is a modern trend to subject health and safety regulations 
to greater First Amendment scrutiny,254 generally under the commer-
cial speech doctrine.255  In recent years, the FDA repeatedly has faced 
First Amendment challenges in various contexts where the agency 
was attempting to protect the public from health claims that, in the 
 
250 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
251 See discussion supra Part II and Table 1. 
252 See Orentlicher, supra note 191, at 300 (“When private or public actors invoked health 
concerns to justify their conduct, the Court often expressed less skepticism than when 
other reasons were invoked for public or private conduct.”). 
253 Id. at 302 (noting erosion of the special status of health care as a justification for regula-
tion). 
254 Id. at 299. 
255 See Samp, supra note 249, at 314; see also Cortez, supra note 249, at 397. 
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agency’s view, were scientifically uncertain.256  For example, a 2002 
case, Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,257 challenged the agen-
cy’s efforts to restrict advertising by compounding pharmacies.258  
These pharmacies offer custom-made drugs for patients who need 
special preparations (for example, if the patient is allergic to an inac-
tive ingredient in the standard preparation).  The FDA does not sub-
ject compounded drugs to the same clinical trial and premarket re-
view requirements that apply to ordinary new drugs.  Consequently, 
advertising of compounded drugs has the potential to promote drugs 
with poorly validated safety and effectiveness.  In order to protect the 
public, the agency sought to restrict such advertising.  The Supreme 
Court held that these restrictions violated the First Amendment.  
Other cases have challenged the agency’s efforts to restrict off-label 
promotion of drugs and medical devices.259  Off-label promotion in-
volves health claims that have not been validated according to the 
agency’s usual evidentiary standards.  The First Amendment con-
strains the FDA’s ability to restrict speech about off-label uses.260  Still 
other cases have challenged the agency’s regulation of health claims 
for foods and dietary supplements.261 
 
256 See Cortez, supra note 249, at 395–97 (listing twenty-four cases in which firms subject to 
various forms of FDA regulation—including drug, device, compounding pharmacy, die-
tary supplement, and food regulation—have claimed First Amendment protection). 
257 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
258 Id. at 367–68 (treating advertising by a compounding pharmacy as commercial speech 
that was entitled to First Amendment protection, notwithstanding the fact that the re-
strictions were intended to promote health). 
259 See, e.g., United States. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 158–162 (2d Cir. 2012) (vacating the 
conviction of a pharmaceutical sales representative for promoting off-label use of a drug, 
holding that the government had prosecuted the defendant for his speech, and that such 
prosecution violated the First Amendment); Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 
F. Supp. 2d. 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that the FDA violated the First Amendment by 
placing certain restrictions on drug manufacturers’ ability to disseminate reprints that 
discuss off-label uses and by restricting their involvement in continuing medical educa-
tion seminars and symposia); see also United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d. 935, 939 (7th Cir. 
2008) (criticizing the FDA’s ban on off-label promotion on First Amendment grounds but 
deciding the case on other grounds); Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 194, at 338–50 (ar-
guing that the FDA’s current ban on drug manufacturers’ promotion of off-label uses of 
drugs is unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds). 
260 See supra note 259. 
261 See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (requiring the  
FDA, under the commercial speech doctrine, to consider whether including appropriate 
disclaimers—as opposed to banning speech altogether—would negate potentially mis-
leading nature of manufacturer’s claims that dietary supplements and food fiber can re-
duce the risks of certain cancers and neural tube defects); Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 2, 7 (D.D.C. 2002) (granting preliminary injunction removing the FDA’s ban 
on health claims in dietary supplement labeling after finding that the claims were not in-
herently misleading and were only potentially deceptive); Alliance for Natural Health US 
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Health-claims cases exemplify the point that the Central Hudson 
test can produce varying outcomes, depending on how well the par-
ticular speech restrictions are designed and how well the agency justi-
fies its need to regulate the claims.  In food and dietary supplement 
health-claims cases, courts have found some challenged speech re-
strictions to be unconstitutional while finding others to be permissi-
ble regulation of commercial speech.  Thus, some health claims are 
regulable speech, while other health claims are eligible to and actual-
ly do receive constitutional protection.  Health claims that appear in 
the labeling of FDA-approved drugs are regulable speech because—at 
least to date262—the FDA premarket approval process for validating 
these claims continues to be regarded as a permissible regulation of 
free speech.  In contrast, advertising of compounded drugs and vari-
ous forms of speech promoting off-label uses of drugs have been held 
to be commercial speech that is protected by the First Amendment.  
Health-claims cases go both ways. 
Even when a government agency has an extensive mandate to 
regulate the safety of drugs, devices, or other products and services, 
this does not necessarily imply that the agency can suppress speech as 
a way to promote that objective: 
[T]he argument that a certain subset of speech may be considered com-
pletely outside of the First Amendment framework because the speech 
occurs in an area of extensive government regulation is a proposition 
whose continuing validity is at best questionable in light of the Supreme 
Court’s most recent commercial speech cases.263 
[T]he Constitution presumes that attempts to regulate speech are more 
dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct.  That presumption accords 
with the essential role that the free flow of information plays in a demo-
cratic society.  As a result, the First Amendment directs that the govern-
ment may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress conduct.264 
These principles have obvious importance in the context of return of 
results.  Even though the CLIA authorizes the CMS to ensure the 
 
v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2010) (requiring, on First Amendment grounds, 
that the FDA consider whether inclusion of disclaimers would negate potentially mislead-
ing effect of manufacturer’s claims concerning selenium and cancer and also holding 
that the FDA’s replacement of a claim related to prostate cancer risk was inconsistent with 
the First Amendment). 
262 See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-label Drug Use and Promotion:  Balancing Public Health 
Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 246 (2011) (“Recent Supreme Court 
precedent in this area suggests that the FDA’s blanket prohibition on off-label promotion 
could be ripe for challenge.”). 
263 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 60; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 567 n.10 (1980) (“Several commercial speech decisions have in-
volved enterprises subject to extensive state regulation.”). 
264 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 (1996). 
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quality of laboratory testing, and even though OHRP has authority to 
ensure ethical treatment of human research subjects, these mandates 
do not necessarily empower the agencies to suppress speech to pro-
mote those objectives.  “[S]peech restrictions cannot be treated as 
simply another means that the government may use to achieve its 
ends.”265  Using experimental tests to study biospecimens is a form of 
conduct and the government, if it has a good reason to do so, can 
regulate or even ban such conduct.  The fact that the government 
could ban experimental testing does not, however, imply that the 
government can ban speech about experimental test results.266  To de-
termine whether specific legal restrictions on the return of results vio-
late the Constitution, it is necessary to analyze them using the four-
factor Central Hudson framework. 
B.  Is the Return of Results Eligible for Constitutional Protection? 
The first step of Central Hudson analysis examines characteristics of 
the speech itself.  “For commercial speech to come within [the First 
Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading.”267  The analysis below concludes that the return of results 
satisfies both these criteria, based on how courts have applied them 
in relevant commercial speech cases. 
Return of results is speech related to a lawful activity.  Return of results 
is not the type of speech that Central Hudson refers to as “speech relat-
ed to illegal activity.”268  Even if a state law, the CLIA regulations, or 
an IRB acting pursuant to the Common Rule has “banned” the re-
turn of results, an investigator who defies the ban and returns results 
is not engaging in speech related to unlawful activity.  Courts ad-
dressed a virtually identical question in cases challenging FDA re-
strictions on off-label promotion of drugs and medical devices.269  In 
one of those cases,270 the FDA argued that the speech concerned un-
lawful activity because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits 
 
265 Id. 
266 Id. (rejecting the reasoning of an earlier case, Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass’n v. Tourism Co. of 
Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), which had held that the government’s power to regulate 
casino gambling implied a power to regulate speech about casino gambling). 
267 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
268 Id. at 564. 
269 See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d. 51, 66 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(determining that off-label promotion of drugs is not speech related to an unlawful activi-
ty); United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (addressing this 
question in a case involving a man who was facing criminal charges for violating an FDA 
ban on off-label promotion of medical devices). 
270 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 66. 
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manufacturers’ speech about off-label uses of medical products.  
“The court properly rejected this argument stating that the ‘proper 
inquiry is not whether the speech violates a law or regulation, but ra-
ther whether the conduct the speech promotes violates the law.’”271 
An advertisement seeking to sell illegal narcotics or soliciting 
prostitutes would qualify as speech concerning unlawful activity.272  In 
contrast, talking about a lawful use of a legal medical product or 
about a lawfully conducted genetic test simply does not qualify.  
“Promotion of off-label uses does not promote unlawful activity be-
cause off-label use of drugs and medical devices by physicians is not 
unlawful.”273  In the same way, telling a participant his or her genetic 
test results is not speech related to an unlawful activity.  Rather, it is 
speech about genetic testing.  If it was lawful to conduct the test, then 
returning results from the test is speech related to lawful activity for 
purposes of Central Hudson analysis. 
Contrasting concepts of vulnerability in bioethics and law.  Whether off-
label promotion is misleading is a “closer question”274 and the same is 
true of return of results.  As summarized in Table 1, bioethicists ex-
press various concerns about the return of results and many of these 
are rooted in the belief that scientifically uncertain or poorly validat-
ed genetic test results will mislead research participants.  For exam-
ple, the participants may misunderstand their results;275 these misun-
derstandings may lead to anxiety or bad healthcare decisions;276 and 
participants may propagate their misunderstandings to other people, 
adding to public confusion about the human genome.277  These con-
cerns cast research participants as vulnerable, incompetent listeners 
who may misunderstand and respond in inappropriate ways to what 
they are told. 
The field of law also recognizes concerns about listener vulnera-
bility.  Professor Post has observed that First Amendment protection 
of speech seems to depend somewhat on characteristics of the listen-
er:  First Amendment doctrine seems to protect a sphere of commu-
nication between people who “are presumed to be independent and 
self-possessed,” but is less likely to protect “communications between 
 
271 Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (emphasis added) (citing WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 66). 
272 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 
(1973). 
273 Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 
341, 350 (2001)). 
274 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 66; Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 920–21. 
275 See supra Part II, Table 1, item 4. 
276 Id. at items 3, 5, and 8. 
277 Id. at item 10. 
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persons deemed to be involved in relationships of dependence or re-
liance.”278  By this view, First Amendment doctrine protects speech in 
situations where the listeners are conceived as autonomous, self-
determining individuals, but when listeners are conceived as vulnera-
ble and not able to discern their own best interests, there is a greater 
willingness to let the government regulate what the listeners can be 
told. 
The problem with this concern is that virtually all speech is mis-
leading if one presumes a sufficiently unsophisticated listener.  Sup-
pressing speech can inflict real injuries on speakers and listeners 
alike.279  “To allow [communication] to be fettered is to fetter our-
selves.”280  It compounds an insult with an injury to declare people na-
ïve and then cite their alleged naiveté as a reason to wall them off 
from communication.  As a federal appeals court noted in a First 
Amendment case involving regulation of scientifically uncertain 
health claims, “If the protections afforded commercial speech are to 
retain their force, we cannot allow rote invocation of the words ‘po-
tentially misleading’ to supplant the [government’s] burden to 
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction 
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”281  The Supreme 
Court maintains that “[t]his burden is not satisfied by mere specula-
tion or conjecture.”282 
While law and bioethics both recognize the problem of listener 
vulnerability, law is somewhat more cautious about asserting that 
people are vulnerable as a reason to forbid others to speak to them.  
When bioethicists assert that people are vulnerable or incompetent, 
this often is done with the best motives and in a spirit of erring on the 
side of protecting people.  Lawyers perhaps take a more jaundiced 
view of such assertions, having often seen them made with nefarious 
motives (for example, adult child seeks to have mom declared in-
competent with the aim of taking control of her assets). 
The legal concept of misleading speech.  Rote assertions that return of 
results is misleading283 may be enough to convince bioethicists that it 
 
278 Post, supra note 200, at 23. 
279 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for 
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” (citing N.Y. 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971))). 
280 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (speaking of a free press). 
281 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
282 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993). 
283 Id. 
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is appropriate to suppress speech, but they would not convince a 
court.  “Because there is a constitutional presumption in favor of 
speech, a defendant has the burden of proof to rebut that presump-
tion with evidence that the speech is inherently misleading.”284  In 
First Amendment cases where a speaker is challenging a speech re-
striction, the defendant is the proponent of the speech restriction 
(usually a state or the federal government).  Thus, the party who 
wants to restrict speech has the burden to prove it is misleading.285  
“[M]ost courts have become increasingly demanding in insisting that 
regulatory restrictions be buttressed by hard evidence supporting the 
necessity of such restrictions.”286 
Courts recognize a distinction between speech that is inherently 
misleading and speech that is only potentially misleading.287  Inher-
ently misleading commercial speech is not entitled to constitutional 
protection and the government may regulate it or ban it altogether.288  
If speech is only potentially misleading, it is eligible for constitutional 
protection and the government can regulate it only if the other three 
Central Hudson factors are met (that is, if there is a substantial gov-
ernment interest that is directly advanced by the regulation, which 
must be no more extensive than necessary).289 
Central Hudson considered speech inherently misleading if it was 
“more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”290  An earlier 
case had formulated this concept by saying that the speech “more of-
ten than not will be injurious.”291  Some cases,292 although it arguably 
is simplistic to do so, seem to relate the distinction between potential-
 
284 Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1180 (D. Colo. 2001) (citing 
Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 106 F.3d 929, 932–33 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
285 See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770–71 (“[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction 
on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its re-
striction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”). 
286 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF LAWYER ADVERTISING § 6:2 (updated Oct. 2013). 
287 Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 2002) (demonstrating that the Su-
preme Court had recognized a distinction between inherently and potentially misleading 
speech even before Central Hudson) (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). 
288 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) 
(“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages 
that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.  The government may ban 
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.” (citing 
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 
464 (1978)). 
289 See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); see also Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 
13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 (D.D.C. 1998); Borgner, 284 F.3d at 1210. 
290 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (citing Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13;  Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464). 
291 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466. 
292 See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 636 (6th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing 
various types of health claims). 
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ly and inherently misleading claims to the distinction between true 
claims and false or deceptive claims.  Thus, “[t]ruthful advertising” is 
constitutionally protected,293 but the government is “free to prevent 
the dissemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or 
misleading.”294  Showing that a claim is true strongly militates against 
the conclusion that it is inherently misleading, even if listeners are 
apt to form a false impression from it.  However, the concept of “de-
ceptive” leaves the door slightly ajar for a factually true statement 
nevertheless to be inherently misleading.  Some courts take the view 
that “speech is only ‘inherently misleading’ if it would be misleading 
in all circumstances”295 and treat speech as merely “potentially mis-
leading” if it is misleading in some circumstances but not in others.296  
Some courts consider that for “a particular mode of communication 
to be inherently misleading, it must be incapable of being presented 
in a way that is not deceptive.”297  Simply declaring that speech is in-
herently misleading is not sufficient to justify restrictions on speech: 
Whether speech is “inherently misleading” . . . is a determination for the 
court, not the legislature [or regulators], to make.  If a legislature could 
place speech outside of First Amendment protection by simply declaring 
the speech “inherently misleading,” the First Amendment to the United 
States would be subject to de facto modification by state legislatures.  
Clearly, this would violate the Supremacy Clause.298 
“Whether speech is inherently misleading depends upon . . . the 
possibilities for deception, whether experience has proved that in fact 
that such advertising is subject to abuse, and the ability of the intend-
ed audience to evaluate the claims made.”299  The listener’s sophistica-
tion is one factor courts consider but it is not necessarily dispositive.  
In United States v. Caputo, which involved off-label promotion of a 
medical device, the court noted the fact that the promotion was di-
 
293 R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. 
294 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 638 
(1985) (citing Friedman, 440 U.S. at 1). 
295 Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1181 (D. Colo. 2001). 
296 Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 730–31 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 
U.S. 812 (1995) (determining that environmental claims using the terms “ozone friend-
ly,” “biodegradable,” “photodegradable,” “recyclable,” and “recycled” were only potential-
ly misleading). 
297 See, e.g., Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 106 F.3d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 
1997) (citing R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203). 
298 Bioganic, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1180; see also Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary 
Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990) (stating that whether speech is inherently misleading is 
a “question of law”). 
299 Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66–67 (D.D.C. 1998) (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Caputo, 288 F. 
Supp. 2d 912, 920−21 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 51). 
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rected at physicians, a sophisticated audience, before concluding that 
the speech was not inherently misleading.300  But courts sometimes 
focus on other factors.  In Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman,301 
an off-label drug promotion case, the court focused primarily on the 
nature and intrinsic reliability of the speech (which involved distrib-
uting peer-reviewed articles that discussed off-label uses)302 in con-
cluding that it was not inherently misleading.303 
When cases involve uncertain or poorly substantiated health and 
environmental claims, a key question is whether adding a disclosure 
or disclaimer would “suffice to mitigate the claim’s misleadingness.”304  
Whether to ban speech or simply require disclosures is mainly a ques-
tion for Step Four of Central Hudson analysis, when courts consider 
whether the government’s speech restrictions are more extensive 
than they need to be.  However, disclosures also may be relevant dur-
ing Step One as courts decide whether speech is inherently mislead-
ing.  If adding a disclosure would make speech non-misleading, this 
tends to suggest that the speech is only potentially misleading, and 
the proper response may be to regulate it by requiring the needed 
warning or disclosure.305  If the problem simply cannot be cured by 
adding disclaimers, then the speech may well be inherently mislead-
ing such that an outright ban is justified.306  Thus, the effectiveness of 
disclaimers is mainly a question for Step Four, but it also may be rele-
vant during Step One of Central Hudson analysis. 
Are poorly substantiated health claims inherently misleading?  An influ-
ential case on these issues is Pearson v. Shalala307 (“Pearson I”) involving 
a First Amendment challenge to restrictions the FDA imposed on 
 
300 Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 921. 
301 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 51. 
302 Id. at 67. 
303 Id. at 68−69. 
304 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (not ruling out the pos-
sibility that it would be permissible for the FDA to ban a claim outright if the claim’s mis-
leading nature was “incurable by a disclaimer” (citing FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobac-
co Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42−43 (D.C. Cir. 1985))). 
305 See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (“[T]he States may not place an absolute 
prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information . . . if the information 
also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.”); see also Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 659 
(“The government’s general concern that . . . consumers might assume that a claim on a 
supplement’s label is approved by the government, suggests an obvious answer:  The 
agency could require the label to state that ‘The FDA does not approve this claim.’”). 
306 See Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 118 (D.D.C. 2001) (“[Pearson I] 
clearly ruled that the FDA may not prohibit a health claim unless it first makes a ‘show-
ing’ that the claim’s alleged ‘misleadingness’ could not be cured through the use of a dis-
claimer or other types of disclosure.”). 
307 Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 650. 
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health claims for dietary supplements.  In Pearson I, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals considered whether “health claims lacking ‘signifi-
cant scientific agreement’ are inherently misleading and thus entirely 
outside the protection of the First Amendment.”308  The agency had 
asserted its “common sense judgment” that it advances consumers’ 
health for the FDA to ban health claims that have not been approved 
by the agency under a “significant scientific agreement” standard.309  
The court of appeals stated that it regarded “as dubious any justifica-
tion that is based on the benefits of public ignorance”310 and rejected 
the FDA’s assertion in scathing terms: 
As best we understand the government, its [argument] runs along the 
following lines: that health claims lacking “significant scientific agree-
ment” are inherently misleading because they have such an awesome im-
pact on consumers as to make it virtually impossible for them to exercise 
any judgment at the point of sale.  It would be as if the consumers were 
asked to buy something while hypnotized, and therefore they are bound 
to be misled.  We think this contention is almost frivolous.  We reject it.311 
In Pearson I, the court of appeals referred favorably to an earlier 
case that rejected the “paternalistic assumption” that recipients of an 
allegedly misleading communication are “no more discriminating 
than the audience for children’s television.”312  Whether speech is in-
herently misleading should not be judged by reference to the most 
credulous listener who ever might be exposed to it.  Other courts 
have indicated that “the mere fact that someone is misled by a partic-
ular communication is not proof that the communication is inherent-
ly misleading.”313 
Some courts want to see evidence that listeners’ confusion was 
caused by the speech that the government is seeking to ban, rather than by 
some other source of information.  In a case where the State of Ohio 
alleged that a milk label was giving consumers the false impression 
that it is safer to drink milk from cows not treated with artificial hor-
 
308 Id. at 655. 
309 Id. at 656.  Pearson I also involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the FDA’s ill-
defined “significant scientific agreement” standard, id. at 655, but the court of appeals 
found that the FDA’s failure to define the standard violated the Administrative Procedure 
Act, so it did not need to decide those constitutional issues, id. at 660. 
310 Id. at 656 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977)). 
311 Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 655 (citation omitted); see also Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman 
(WLF I), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 1998) (“In asserting that any and all scientific 
claims . . . are presumptively untruthful or misleading until the FDA has had the oppor-
tunity to evaluate them, FDA exaggerates its overall place in the universe.”). 
312 Id. (citing Peel v. Attorney Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 111 (1990) (Marshall, J., 
concurring)). 
313 Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1181 (D. Colo. 2001). 
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mones, the state pointed to some allegedly confused customers to 
support its allegation that the label was inherently misleading.314  
However, the court noted that one of these customers claimed that 
she formed the impression that the milk was safer based on conversa-
tions with her oncologist, rather than by reading milk labels.315  The 
fact that oncologists make inaccurate statements was no reason to ban 
the labeling of milk. 
Moreover, courts tend not to judge whether a claim is inherently 
misleading under the worst-case assumptions that bioethicists some-
times employ when assessing risks.316  Courts’ non-alarmist approach 
is exemplified by the case Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, which 
held that it was not inherently misleading for a pesticide to claim that 
it was “safe for kids.”317  The State of Colorado had asserted that 
“there is no realistic way to counter the misleading impression that 
such pesticide is safe for all kids of all ages with whatever mental or 
physical health problems they may have.”318  The court, however, 
found it implausible to believe that consumers reading the claim 
would think it meant the product “safe for all kids of all ages and all 
possible health problems or disabilities without any responsible adult su-
pervision.”319  The court rejected the state’s worst-case (and hidden) 
assumption that children purchase and use pesticides with no in-
volvement of their parents. 
In Pearson I, the “Court of Appeals strongly suggested, without de-
claring so explicitly, that [the unconfirmed health claim in question] 
was only ‘potentially misleading,’ not ‘inherently misleading’”320 and 
“that when ‘credible evidence’ supports a claim . . . that claim may 
not be absolutely prohibited.”321 Pearson I suggests that when a claim 
has considerable evidence to support it but the evidence is mixed or 
unclear, the proper approach is to disclose the uncertainty rather 
than ban the speech altogether.322  However, Pearson I does not rule 
out the possibility that a ban may be warranted if the evidence is so 
 
314 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 638 (6th Cir. 2010). 
315 Id. at 638−39. 
316 See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS, WORST CASE BIOETHICS, at xi (2010) (reflecting on the use 
of worst case scenarios and commenting that worst case scenarios are almost always coun-
terproductive as planning exercises). 
317 Bioganic, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 
318 Id. at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
319 Id. (emphasis added). 
320 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 110 (D.D.C. 2001). 
321 Id. at 114 (citing Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
322 Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 659. 
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heavily skewed against a claim that a disclaimer would not suffice.323  
Pearson I envisioned that this might occur “where evidence in support 
of a claim is outweighed by evidence against the claim.”324 
For example, if the weight of the evidence were against the hypothetical 
claim that “Consumption of Vitamin E reduces the risk of Alzheimer’s 
disease,” the agency might reasonably determine that adding a disclaimer 
such as “The FDA has determined that no evidence supports this claim” 
would not suffice to mitigate the claim’s misleadingness.325 
Note, however, that Pearson I did not envision banning speech in situ-
ations where evidence supporting a claim is weak but uncontradicted.  
Pearson I left open the possibility of banning speech only when the ev-
idence cuts both ways and the weight of the evidence disfavors the 
claim.326 
A later case, Pearson II, challenged whether the FDA had appro-
priately applied this concept.327  The agency had banned a claim 
about the health effects of folic acid after stating that the claim was 
against the weight of scientific evidence.328  Courts have “the authority 
to examine and rule on any actions of a federal agency that allegedly 
violate the Constitution,” and courts give little deference to a regula-
tor’s opinion about constitutional questions.329  In contrast, courts 
generally do give considerable “deference to an agency’s assessment 
of scientific or technical data within its area of expertise.”330  The 
court in Pearson II was “mindful that it is generally not for the judicial 
branch to undertake comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific 
evidence,”331 but nevertheless proceeded to do so.  The court con-
cluded that “even a cursory examination of the scientific literature on 
which the FDA relied in its Folic Acid Decision demonstrates that the 
FDA’s conclusion that the ‘weight’ of the evidence was against plain-
tiff’s Folic Acid claim was arbitrary, capricious and otherwise in viola-
 
323 Id. 
324 Id. 
325 Id. 
326 Id. 
327 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 107 (D.D.C. 2001). 
328 Id. at 115. 
329 See, e.g., Alliance for Natural Health US v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 n.10 (D.D.C. 
2011) (quoting Alliance for Natural Health US v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 59 n.20 
(D.D.C. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Serono Labs Inc. v. Shalala, 
158 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Agency evaluations of scientific data within its area 
of expertise, and hence is entitled to a high level of deference.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
330 Alliance for Natural Health US, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 12. 
331 Pearson II, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (quoting NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tion of law.”332  Those who wish to ban a scientific claim cannot simply 
make conclusory statements that the weight of the evidence is against 
the claim.  The weight of the evidence really must be against it, and 
in First Amendment cases, courts are prepared to depart from their 
usual deferential posture in order to verify that this is so. 
Are claims inherently misleading if current science can neither prove them 
nor disprove them?  The 2010 milk-labeling case, International Dairy 
Foods Ass’n v. Boggs,333 pondered a question that is highly relevant to 
the return of results:  Are claims inherently misleading when the 
technology to confirm that they are true simply does not yet exist?  In 
that case, an Ohio regulation refused to let farmers label their milk 
“rbST free” in situations where the farmers had avoided treating their 
cows with the artificial hormone rbST to stimulate milk production.334  
The state alleged—and a lower court had agreed—that such claims 
were inherently misleading because, using current testing technolo-
gy, there is no detectable difference between milk produced by rbST-
free and rbST-treated cows.335  Thus, the label created a misleading 
impression that “rbST-free” milk was better than other milk, when no 
real difference could be measured. 
On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that 
“the failure to discover rbST in [milk from treated cows] is not neces-
sarily because the artificial hormone is absent in such milk, but rather 
because scientists have been unable to perfect a test to detect it.”336  
Using present testing technology, the notion that milk from rbST-free 
cows is safer than other milk was not provably true, but neither was it 
provably false.  If it was not provably false, then it was not “inherently 
misleading” to leave consumers with the impression that it may be 
true.337  Any misimpression could be addressed by requiring disclo-
sure that it simply is not presently known whether the milk is differ-
ent.338  Labeling milk “rbST-free” thus was not inherently misleading.  
At oral argument, the state conceded that milk from treated cows 
“could” contain rbST although no test has been able to verify this.339  
 
332 Id. 
333 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010). 
334 Id. at 632. 
335 Id. at 636. 
336 Id. at 637. 
337 See id. (noting that the FDA, in a guidance document, seemed to contemplate that a 
compositional difference may actually exist between the two types of milk and left open 
the possibility that future technologies may be able to detect the presence of rbST in milk 
from treated cows). 
338 Id. at 639–40. 
339 Id. at 637. 
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That concession was fatal to the state’s argument:  if something 
“could” be true, it is hard to maintain that it is inherently misleading. 
As already noted,340 the party wishing to restrict speech has the 
burden to prove it is misleading.  International Dairy Foods displays the 
impact this has in situations where scientific evidence is inconclusive.  
The court of appeals in International Dairy Foods remanded the case 
back to the lower court for further proceedings, indicating that if the 
state wanted to ban the speech as “inherently misleading,” the state 
needed to produce evidence that the speech was false.341  “But there is 
no evidence in the record to verify the State’s contention.  In light of 
this insufficiently developed factual record, the State has not shown 
that it is entitled” to ban the “rbST-free” label as inherently mislead-
ing.342  When the available scientific evidence is inconclusive, it is dif-
ficult indeed for the government to prove a health claim false.  The 
court of appeals commented that “it seems peculiar to deny the con-
sumer, on the ground that the information is incomplete, at least 
some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed deci-
sion.”343  Even if it is not yet known whether milk from “rbST-free” 
cows is better than milk from rbST-treated cows, consumers still may 
benefit from the “incomplete” information that the cow whose milk 
they are drinking was not treated with rbST.  That fact is known, even 
if its significance for the quality of milk products remains uncertain. 
The problem of incomplete information obviously arises when re-
turning genetic test results.  There may be trustworthy information 
that a person has a gene variant but considerable uncertainty about 
that variant’s health or reproductive significance.  Many bioethicists 
agree that it is appropriate to suppress the return of results in this 
situation.344  This view presumes that the investigator who wishes to 
return results has the burden of establishing that the findings have 
the requisite levels of scientific certainty and meaning, before he or 
she can speak.  Yet, as International Dairy Foods makes clear, the bur-
den of validation does not lie with the speaker for First Amendment 
purposes.  Instead, the burden of invalidation rests with those who 
seek to declare the speech inherently misleading and suppress the re-
turn of results. 
 
340 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
341 Boggs, 622 F.3d at 638. 
342 Id. 
343 Id. at 636 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374–75 (1977)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
344 See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.C. 
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In the face of genuine scientific uncertainty (as when a gene-
phenotype association is not clearly established as valid but also is not 
provably invalid), the government has the burden to show that the 
claimed association is false or deceptive before it can suppress 
speech.  If there is some evidence to support the association but the 
association remains subject to uncertainty, the Pearson cases and In-
ternational Dairy Foods v. Boggs suggest it would not be constitutional to 
ban the speech outright, although it may be perfectly appropriate to 
require a disclosure that frankly admits how uncertain or even dubi-
ous the association actually is.  If the available evidence simply cannot 
confirm whether the claim is true or false, then the party who bears 
the burden of proof will lose.  The First Amendment rests that bur-
den on those who would suppress speech rather than on the speaker. 
Who has the burden of validating or invalidating health claims?  The 
cautious bioethical view treats the speaker as bearing the burden of 
validation in situations where scientific evidence is inconclusive.  That 
approach would not satisfy a court in a First Amendment challenge to 
a law or regulation that restricts the return of results.  Because this 
point is so critical in the present bioethical debate, it bears repeating 
for emphasis:  as Pearson II points out, “even if [a claim] is in some re-
spects ‘potentially misleading,’ the resulting injury that could flow to 
consumers cannot compare, as a matter of law, with the First 
Amendment injury” that comes from unwarranted suppression of 
speech.345  The government “may not place an absolute prohibition 
on . . . potentially misleading information . . . if the information also 
may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.”346 
Pearson I “clearly ruled that the FDA may not prohibit a health 
claim unless it first makes a ‘showing’ that the claim’s alleged ‘mis-
leadingness’ could not be cured through the use of a disclaimer or 
other types of disclosure.”347  Subsequent cases have debated just how 
much actual evidence this “showing” requires.348 In Pearson I, the FDA 
 
345 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 119 (D.D.C. 2001). 
346 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing In re R.M.J., 455 
U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). 
347 Pearson II, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (discussing Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 658). 
348 See Alliance for Natural Health US v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 62 (D.D.C. 2010) (stat-
ing that the court in Whitaker v. Thompson arguably went even further than Pearson I by 
suggesting that the government must provide empirical evidence proving that the public 
would still be deceived even if the claim was qualified by a disclaimer) (referencing Whit-
aker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2002)).  But see Alliance for Natural 
Health US v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2011) (“This Court agrees that Pear-
son I does not require the FDA to make an empirical showing of the inefficacy of a dis-
claimer before prohibiting a claim that is not supported by credible evidence.”). 
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asserted that adding disclaimers to uncertain health claims would 
confuse consumers,349 but “all the government offer[ed] in support 
[was] the FDA’s pronouncement that ‘consumers would be consider-
ably confused by a multitude of claims with differing degrees of relia-
bility.’”350  This unsupported assertion was not sufficient to justify a 
speech ban.  Anyone seeking to ban the return of uncertain or poorly 
substantiated results should be aware that courts expect real evidence 
of why a disclosure would not work.  Courts continue to debate pre-
cisely how much evidence is required,351 but merely alleging that “par-
ticipants will be confused” is clearly not enough. 
Many scholars in the fields of bioethics and medicine call for evi-
dence-based medicine, but do not see a corresponding need for evi-
dence-based policies and evidence-based regulations.  Many recom-
mendations to suppress the return of research results rest on little 
more than conjectures and suppositions.  Holm and Taylor note that 
return of “genomic research results has historically been opposed, by 
some, based on an assumption that therapeutic misconceptions are 
inevitable, that harm necessarily flows from a misconception and is 
unpreventable and incurable, and that such harm necessarily out-
weighs any potential benefit, regardless of how benefit might be con-
ceived or measured.”352  In other words, bioethicists at times seem to 
presume that research participants are, to use Pearson I’s words, “no 
more discriminating than the audience for children’s television.”353  If 
the recommended speech restrictions were implemented into law, 
those laws would face First Amendment challenges, and courts in 
those challenges would expect proponents of speech restrictions to 
present real evidence to support these conjectures, suppositions, and 
assumptions.  As the Supreme Court stated in Central Hudson, “condi-
tional and remote eventualities cannot justify silencing” speech.354  
The First Amendment requires proponents of speech restrictions to 
show that the proposed restrictions are evidence-based regulations.  
Little in the literature on return of results suggests the bioethics 
community would be able to do so. 
 
349 Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 659. 
350 Id. (quoting the FDA’s pronouncement at 59 Fed. Reg. at 6279). 
351 See supra note 348 (listing cases that have debated this point). 
352 Holm & Taylor, supra note 121, at 670; see also Kohane & Taylor, supra note 112, at 1–2 
(“[P]roviding results would both depend on and foster the misconception that clinical 
research is about clinical care (referred to here as therapeutic misconception).”). 
353 Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 655 (quoting Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 
496 U.S. 91, 105 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
354 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980). 
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Conclusion:  Return of results is eligible for constitutional protection.  The 
return of results is neither “speech related to unlawful activity” nor is 
it “inherently misleading.”  It is therefore eligible for First Amend-
ment protection as commercial speech.  After Step One of Central 
Hudson analysis, the focus shifts away from the speech that is being 
regulated and toward the regulation itself.  Regulations restricting 
lawful, non-misleading speech must satisfy three constraints:355 the 
government’s asserted interest in regulating the speech must be sub-
stantial;356 the regulation must directly advance that interest;357 and 
the restriction on speech must be no more extensive than neces-
sary.358  A law or regulation must satisfy all three of these conditions 
and is unconstitutional if it fails any one of these criteria. 
C.  Does the Government Have a Substantial Interest in Suppressing the 
Return of Results? 
Because Steps Two–Four of the Central Hudson test are regulation-
specific, a separate analysis is necessary for each law or regulation that 
is facing a First Amendment challenge.  For example, a state law that 
restricts the return of results would need to be analyzed separately 
from restrictions imposed under CLIA’s research exception.  Fortu-
nately, case law reveals several common principles that have general 
relevance when determining, at Step Two of Central Hudson analysis, 
whether the government has a substantial interest in suppressing 
speech. 
The government’s “asserted interest in regulating speech” refers 
to the objective the government claims it is trying to achieve by im-
posing speech restrictions.  To ascertain the government’s interest, 
courts consider statements the government made when it imposed 
the speech restrictions as well as explanations the government offers 
at the time of the First Amendment challenge.  Courts tend to be fair-
ly deferential to the government’s assessment that a particular inter-
est is substantial.  It is not uncommon to see a court simply assume 
after cursory analysis that the government’s stated interest is substan-
tial and then move on to Steps Three and Four of Central Hudson 
analysis.359  The government often is able to slip through Step Two by 
 
355 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
356 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
357 Id. 
358 Id. 
359 See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 655–66 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that 
the FDA’s asserted interests were protection of public health and prevention of consumer 
fraud and noting that, at this level of generality, therefore, a substantial governmental in-
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asserting a general interest in “ensuring the accuracy of commercial 
information in the marketplace”360 or in “promoting the health, safe-
ty, and welfare of its citizens.”361  Occasionally, however, courts do find 
fault with the government’s asserted interest and conclude that a 
speech regulation is unconstitutional at Step Two.  Cases where this 
has happened demonstrate three points that are relevant to the re-
turn of results. 
The government’s interest in keeping the public from being misled.  The 
first point is that the government’s interest in protecting the public 
from being misled does not justify banning health claims that are un-
certain but not provably false.  Some courts reach this conclusion at 
Step Two of Central Hudson analysis; they reject the notion that the 
government has a substantial interest in shielding people from 
speech that is scientifically uncertain.362  In the International Dairy 
Foods and Bioganic cases discussed earlier, the only asserted govern-
mental interests were to protect the public from being misled.363  In 
International Dairy Foods, the milk processors who were challenging 
the state’s labeling regulations were willing to concede that the state 
had a substantial interest in preventing consumer deception.  The 
court was less willing to concede this and insisted that “the State bears 
the burden to demonstrate that the harms it recites are real.”364  This 
was difficult for the state to do because the court had just concluded, 
in Step One of the Central Hudson analysis, that the milk labels in 
question were not inherently misleading.  In light of that finding, the 
state’s proof fell short of establishing the substantial interest required 
at Step Two.365 
In Bioganic,366 the court chided the state for “misapprehend[ing] 
the analysis prescribed by Central Hudson.”367  The court pointed out 
 
terest is undeniable, and that the more significant questions under Central Hudson are the 
next two factors). 
360 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993). 
361 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995). 
362 Other courts address the issue at Steps Three and Four of Central Hudson analysis, reject-
ing a speech ban as too drastic a response when disclosure would alert listeners to the sci-
entific uncertainty. 
363 See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 638 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that the 
purpose of the challenged milk-labeling state regulation was to prevent the use of false 
and misleading labeling); Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d, 1168, 
1182 (D. Colo. 2001) (“According to Defendant, Colorado has a substantial interest in 
protecting the public from claims that pesticides are ‘safe,’ which by their very nature are 
inherently misleading.” (citation omitted)). 
364 Boggs, 622 F.3d at 638 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 
136, 146 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
365 Id. at 639. 
366 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. 
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that if the claims were inherently misleading, the Central Hudson anal-
ysis would have ended at Step One.  The fact that the analysis had 
proceeded to Step Two implied that the claims were not inherently 
misleading.368  Therefore, the state could not maintain it had a sub-
stantial interest in protecting the public from inherently misleading 
claims.  In Bioganic, the state’s speech ban was found unconstitutional 
after Step Two of the analysis because the state had failed to identify a 
substantial interest that the speech ban would serve.369 
Based on these decisions, the government does not have a sub-
stantial interest in banning the return of results that are uncertain or 
that lack an established clinical or reproductive significance.  As ex-
plained in Part IV.C supra, such results are not inherently misleading 
in a legal sense of the word.  To ban the return of such results, the 
government needs to do more than merely assert an interest in keep-
ing research subjects from being misled.370  Even if speech “com-
municates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First 
Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than 
no information at all.”371  The government does not have a substantial 
interest in shielding people from the reality that some scientific find-
ings are uncertain at the time they are communicated. 
The Supreme Court confirmed this in Western States,372 the 2002 
case that challenged the FDA’s ban on advertising by compounding 
pharmacies.  The agency, perhaps familiar with the previous year’s 
decision in Bioganic, did not assert a substantial interest in keeping 
consumers from being misled.  However, a dissenting justice voiced 
concerns about the “systematic effect . . . of [communications] that 
will not fully explain the complicated risks at issue” and worried that 
patients who see such advertisements “will be confused about the 
drug’s risks.”373  Because the dissent had raised this issue, the Court 
proceeded to analyze it.  If the government had an interest in pro-
tecting vulnerable listeners, “this interest could be satisfied by the far 
less restrictive alternative of requiring each compounded drug to be 
labeled with a warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing 
 
367 Id. 
368 Id. 
369 Id. 
370 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 
(1980) (“[I]n recent years th[e Supreme] Court has not approved a blanket ban on 
commercial speech unless the expression itself was flawed in some way, either because it 
was deceptive or related to unlawful activity.”). 
371 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977)). 
372 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
373 Id. at 376. 
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and that its risks were unknown.”374  The Court noted that “the choice 
among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the [legis-
lature’s].  It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of 
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely 
available, that the First Amendment makes for us.”375 
When returning research results that are subject to uncertainty, 
the First Amendment makes a choice:  disclose the uncertainties ra-
ther than ban the speech.  “[I]n recent years, [the Supreme] Court 
has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech unless the ex-
pression itself was flawed in some way, either because it was deceptive 
or related to unlawful activity.”376  A test result that is uncertain, but 
frankly disclosed as such can hardly be viewed as “deceptive.” 
Governmental interests that are inconsistently pursued.  A second rele-
vant point is that it is hard for the government to claim that an inter-
est is “substantial” when the government has a history of pursuing the 
interest in an inconsistent manner.  This point is illustrated in Sorrell 
v. IMS Health, the recent case that challenged a Vermont statute re-
stricting data-mining companies’ ability to disseminate prescriber-
identifying pharmacy records for use in drug marketing.377  The State 
of Vermont asserted that one of its objectives was to protect the con-
fidentiality of physicians’ prescribing records.378  The Supreme Court 
was willing to assume that physicians do have an interest in keeping 
their prescribing decisions confidential.379  However, the state’s as-
serted interest in protecting physician’s privacy was belied by the fact 
that the statute let pharmacies “share prescriber-identifying infor-
mation with anyone for any reason save one:  They must not allow the 
information to be used for marketing” by pharmaceutical compa-
nies.380  It was hard to maintain that the law promoted physician pri-
vacy when the law allowed wide dissemination of their data to all ex-
cept one disfavored class of recipients:  drug manufacturers.  If the 
state’s interest really was substantial, why was the state pursuing that 
interest so haphazardly? 
As the Court noted in a 1999 case, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting 
Ass’n v. United States,381 it is “by no means self-evident”382 that a gov-
 
374 Id. at 376. 
375 Id. at 375 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 770 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
376 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9. 
377 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). 
378 Id. at 2668. 
379 Id. 
380 Id. 
381 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
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ernmental interest is substantial when the government’s policies on 
the matter are “decidedly equivocal.”383  In Sorrell, Vermont’s failure to 
adopt “a more coherent policy”384 for protecting physician’s confiden-
tiality implied that the state’s “asserted interest in physician confiden-
tiality does not justify the burden”385 its law placed on protected 
speech. 
This second point has enormous significance for return of results.  
Many bioethicists recommend suppressing the return of results that 
lack well-established clinical validity and clinical utility.386  Before giv-
ing these recommendations the force of law, the government would 
need to enunciate a substantial interest that is served by restricting 
the communication of research results that lack clinical validity and 
utility.  That would be hard for the government to do, because the ex-
isting CLIA regulations routinely allow CLIA-certified laboratories to 
offer lab-developed tests (“LDTs”) for use in clinical care without re-
quiring proof that the tests have clinical validity or utility.387  Restrict-
ing the return of research results that lack clinical validity or utility 
would, in effect, hold experimental tests to a higher standard than 
CLIA requires of commercially available tests used in clinical care.  
The government’s policy incoherence undercuts the assertion that it 
has a substantial interest in banning the return of research results 
that lack a well-established clinical validity and utility. 
If the government really did have a substantial interest in sup-
pressing communication of test results that lack established clinical 
validity and utility, then the government not only would ban the re-
turn of research results that fit this description but also would amend 
the CLIA regulation to require LDTs to pass through a data-driven 
review of clinical validity and utility before they can be used in clinical 
care.  For more than fifteen years, the government has persistently 
ignored bioethicists’ pleas to subject LDTs to such review.388  After 
 
382 Id. at 186. 
383 Id. at 187. 
384 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668 (quoting Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 195) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
385 Id. at 2668. 
386 See discussion supra Part II. 
387 See TASK FORCE OF GENETIC TESTING, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH-DEP’T OF ENERGY WORKING 
GRP. ON ETHICAL, LEGAL & SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, 
PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 2 (Neil A. 
Holtzman & Michael S. Watson eds., 1997), http://www.genome.gov/10002404 [herein-
after NIH-DOE Report] (discussing the problem of CLIA-regulated lab-developed tests); 
see also SACGT, 2000 REPORT, supra note 38; SACGHS, 2008 REPORT, supra note 80. 
388 See NIH-DOE Report, supra note 387, at ch. 2 (recommending in 1997 that all genetic 
tests, including CLIA-regulated LDTs, should pass through a data-driven review of safety 
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Sorrell and Greater New Orleans, it would be difficult for the govern-
ment to maintain that it has a substantial interest in banning return 
of results that lack clinical validity and utility, when CLIA presently 
allows a vast commerce in such results for use in clinical care. 
Policy incoherence also may exist in connection with CLIA’s regu-
lation of analytical claims (claims of analytical validity) as well as clin-
ical claims (claims that a test has clinical validity and/or utility).  The 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society 
(“SACGHS”) notes that making valid analytical measurements in-
volves several important aspects, one of which is quality control and 
quality assurance (“QC” and “QA”) procedures.389  CLIA requires labs 
to have QA programs, and a key component of these programs is pro-
ficiency testing (“PT”).390  PT is viewed as “the most rigorous form of 
performance assessment”391 and, when Congress authorized the CLIA 
program in 1988, “Congress wanted PT to ‘be the central element of 
determining a laboratory’s competence.’”392  Unfortunately, 
SACGHS’s 2008 report found that CMS-approved PT programs were 
available for “only 83 specific analytes, none of which are genetic tests 
per se.”393  Although, in principle, all genetic tests should undergo PT, 
SACGHS recognized that “such a goal cannot be achieved immedi-
ately”394 because of various constraints including shortages of well-
characterized reference materials for labs to use in PT and internal 
quality assurance activities.395  Such problems may be especially acute 
when dealing with new or novel genetic tests, such as those that are 
the subject of requests for return of results.  In light of the various 
constraints SACGHS noted, it is a challenge for the CLIA program 
even to ensure that clinically available genetic tests have analytical va-
lidity.  This again raises the question of whether calls to restrict the 
return of results may be holding experimental genetic tests to a high-
er standard than is required for tests presently used in clinical care. 
 
and effectiveness before the tests become routinely available in clinical care and after 
they undergo significant modifications); SACGT, 2000 REPORT, supra note 38, at x, 15–20 
(calling in the year 2000 for all genetic tests, including LDTs, to undergo data-driven re-
views focusing on the analytical and clinical validity as well as on any claims the developer 
plans to make about a test’s clinical utility). 
389 SACGHS, 2008 REPORT, supra note 80, at 67. 
390 Id. at 73. 
391 Id. at 7. 
392 Id. at 73 (describing H.R. 100-899’s legislative history). 
393 Id. at 7. 
394 Id. 
395 Id. at 82–83. 
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The government’s interest in keeping people from being upset.  A third 
relevant point is that the government does not have a substantial in-
terest in keeping people from hearing factual statements that may 
make them anxious.  Learning unpleasant facts sometimes upsets 
people but this is no reason for the government to suppress non-
misleading speech.  In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the State of Vermont 
claimed that it had a substantial interest in regulating pharmaceutical 
companies’ detailing operations because such operations may make 
patients “anxious.”396  The state reasoned that patients would worry 
that their doctors were prescribing drugs in response to drug compa-
nies’ marketing efforts, instead of choosing the drug that actually is 
best for the patient.  The Supreme Court rejected this rationale:  
“Speech remains protected even when it may ‘stir people to action,’ 
‘move them to tears,’ or ‘inflict great pain.’”397  The government can 
and does regulate speech in situations where speakers deliberately 
aim to upset people, for example, if a speaker makes threats or speaks 
with the intention of inflicting emotional distress. 398  However, com-
mercial speech almost never has the deliberate aim of threatening or 
upsetting people; its aim is to convey information.  Even if factual in-
formation may have the incidental effect of upsetting people, this is 
no reason to suppress it.  Facts are friendly for purposes of the First 
Amendment.  This is all the more true in light of recent survey data 
that seems to show that returning results does not actually make par-
ticipants as anxious as previously was presumed.399 
Conclusion:  Common rationales for restricting return of results do not sat-
isfy constitutional requirements.  Table 1400 listed various justifications 
that bioethicists offer for suppressing the return of results.  The first 
four items in that table appear unlikely to withstand the second step 
of Central Hudson analysis.  Those justifications were that (1) individ-
ual findings are not reliable information that is worth communi-
cating; (2) returning results is not effective because it may fail to mo-
tivate recipients to take steps to improve their health; (3) returning 
results may cause participants to feel anxious; and (4) participants 
may misunderstand their results.  As just discussed, the government 
 
396 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011). 
397 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
398 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 195, at 492 (discussing the government’s ability to regulate 
tortious or threatening speech). 
399 See Terry, supra note 112, at 713 (“In recent years, some studies suggest that there is less 
anxiety over receiving results than previously thought, though most studies were based on 
cohorts that availed themselves of [genetic] counseling.”). 
400 See supra pp. 580–82. 
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does not have a substantial interest in suppressing the communica-
tion of low-value information, so long as the information is not in-
herently misleading.  If the government could ban low-value speech, 
very little of what most of us say would survive.  The government does 
not have a substantial interest in preventing people from experienc-
ing anxiety in response to unpleasant, uncertain, or incomplete facts.  
The government does not have a substantial interest in keeping peo-
ple from being misled by speech that is not inherently misleading.  
The government’s interest in protecting people from being misled by 
such speech may support disclosure requirements, but does not sup-
port banning the speech. 
D.  Are Regulations Restricting the Return of Results Properly Tailored to 
Advance the Government’s Interests? 
Speech restrictions often receive their toughest scrutiny at Steps 
Three and Four of Central Hudson analysis.  At this point, courts ac-
cept (or assume) that the government is seeking to advance a sub-
stantial interest.  However, the mere fact that the state has a “laudable 
concern . . . does not provide a constitutionally adequate reason for 
restricting protected speech.”401  “If the Government can achieve its 
interests in a manner that does not restrict commercial speech, or 
that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.”402  The regula-
tion must be “in proportion to that interest” and be “designed care-
fully to achieve the State’s goal.”403  Steps Three and Four of the Cen-
tral Hudson test consider “whether the regulation directly advances 
the governmental interest asserted”404 and whether the fit between the 
government’s ends and its means “is not necessarily perfect, but rea-
sonable.”405  These two steps are closely related and are discussed to-
gether below. 
 Suppressing speech that potentially may have bad consequences.  As noted 
in Table 1, bioethicists seeking to suppress the return of results often 
argue that such speech may lead to bad consequences.406  For exam-
ple, returning results may cause research participants to make ill-
advised healthcare decisions that harm them;407 it may expose them to 
 
401 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980). 
402 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 358 (2002). 
403 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
404 Id. at 566. 
405 Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (discussing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, 
566). 
406 See supra Table 1, items 5, 6, 8, 9, 10. 
407 Id. at item 5. 
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a risk of stigmatization or discrimination;408 it may cause them to over-
consume follow-up healthcare services;409 it may divert financial re-
sources from other worthy research projects;410 or it may cause partic-
ipants to propagate inaccurate understandings of the genome as they 
attempt to decipher it for themselves.411  These types of arguments are 
perennial losers at Steps Three and Four of Central Hudson analysis.  
As the Supreme Court stated in Central Hudson, “We review with spe-
cial care regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in or-
der to pursue a non-speech-related policy.  In those circumstances, a 
ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying gov-
ernmental policy.”412 
One of the first modern commercial speech cases, Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,413 rejected the 
idea of banning speech to protect people from the consequences of 
bad decisions they may make in response to the speech.  In that case, 
the state feared that if the public saw ads for low-price pharmacies, 
people would “choose the low-cost, low-quality service and drive the 
‘professional’ pharmacist out of business” and thus “destroy the 
pharmacist-customer relationship.”414  If the state was concerned that 
low-cost pharmacies were offering low-quality service, the proper re-
sponse was to revoke their licenses rather than to restrict their 
speech.415 
The following year, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,416 the state as-
serted that restrictions on attorney advertising were necessary to pro-
tect the public from doing business with low-quality lawyers.  The Su-
preme Court acidly retorted, “Restraints on advertising . . . are an 
ineffective way of deterring shoddy work.”417  The state should regu-
late the lawyers, not their speech.  By this reasoning, suppressing the 
return of results is an ineffective way to protect research participants 
from receiving ill-advised, harmful, shoddy follow-up care from the 
larger U.S. healthcare system.  Bioethicists’ eagerness to regulate 
what laboratories and investigators say sometimes smacks of an un-
 
408 Id. at item 6. 
409 Id. at item 8. 
410 Id. at item 9. 
411 Id. at item 10. 
412 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980). 
413 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
414 Id. at 769. 
415 See id. at 768–69 (noting that the state had extensive power to regulate the quality of 
pharmacy services). 
416 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
417 Id. at 378. 
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willingness to get serious about regulating what doctors do to people.  
If research participants seek unnecessary care based on something a 
genetics researcher told them, then their physicians have a duty not 
to provide that care.  If doctors are doing so, then that is the problem 
bioethicists should focus on, at least as far as the Supreme Court is 
concerned. 
Governmental attempts to use speech restrictions as a tool for ad-
vancing unrelated policy objectives also fail at Steps Three and Four 
of Central Hudson analysis.  In Central Hudson, the state of New York 
had banned advertising by utility companies as a way to advance the 
state’s objective of promoting energy conservation.418  The court 
acknowledged that the state has a substantial interest in energy con-
servation,419 but held that the advertising ban was not a proper way to 
advance that interest.  The advertising ban did have a “direct link” to 
energy conservation,420 but it was more extensive than it needed to 
be.421  It suppressed advertising of energy-efficient consumption prac-
tices as well as wasteful ones.422  The state could have advanced energy 
conservation through less draconian measures such as requiring dis-
closures about the relative efficiency and expense of the utility ser-
vices being advertised423 or pre-screening ads to eliminate only those 
ads that provably promoted waste.424  Justice Blackmun’s concurring 
opinion in Central Hudson railed against the dangers inherent in al-
lowing governmental bodies to “suppress[] . . .  commercial speech in 
order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the avail-
ability of information.”425  He would have applied strict scrutiny to 
governmental attempts to “influence behavior by depriving citizens of 
information.”426 
 
418 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980). 
419 Id. 
420 Id. at 569. 
421 Id. at 570. 
422 Id.; see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376–77 (2002) (rejecting a 
pharmacy advertising ban that was overbroad because, although it arguably protected pa-
tients who should not take compounded drugs, it also blocked useful speech to patients 
who could benefit from such drugs). 
423 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571. 
424 Id. at 571 n.13 (arguing that such prescreening could pass constitutional muster if it in-
cluded adequate procedural safeguards and citing Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 771–72 n.24, as suggesting that traditional prior re-
straint doctrine may not apply to commercial speech). 
425 Id. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
426 Id. at 577; see also id. at 578 (“No differences between commercial speech and other pro-
tected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public con-
duct through manipulation of the availability of information.”). 
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In Western States,427 the FDA claimed that ban on advertising by 
compounding pharmacies was necessary to “preserv[e] the effective-
ness and integrity of the [agency]’s new drug approval process and 
the protection of the public health that it provides” while simultane-
ously “preserv[ing] the availability of compounded drugs for those 
individual patients” who need them.428  The FDA reasoned that if all 
compounded drugs were forced to go through the FDA approval 
process, the drugs would become prohibitively costly for patients who 
need them.429  On the other hand, if the agency let pharmacy com-
pounders advertise their products, this might become a pathway for 
circumventing the FDA approval process for drugs aimed at a wider 
market.  The Court agreed that these interests were substantial.  The 
FDA’s proposed solution was to treat advertising as a trigger for re-
quiring FDA approval.430  Compounders could continue offering their 
products without an FDA approval as long they did not advertise, but 
if compounders wanted to advertise, they would need to go through 
the agency’s regular drug-approval process. 
The Court held that this policy violated the First Amendment.  If 
the agency’s goal was to avoid mass-marketing of compounded drugs, 
there were more direct ways to accomplish that objective.  For exam-
ple, the agency could ban commercial-scale manufacturing by com-
pounding pharmacies, or it could prohibit them from preparing a 
compounded drug in advance of receiving a prescription, or it could 
limit the overall volume of drugs that compounding pharmacies can 
sell in interstate commerce.431  Speech restrictions were justified only 
if the FDA could show that other approaches would not work.432  The 
agency had provided no such evidence and thus it had not justified 
resorting to speech restrictions.433 
The dissent in Western States worried that advertising of com-
pounded drugs would create demand among patients who did not ac-
tually need such drugs.434  The FDA, apparently aware of past cases 
like Virginia Board, had not even attempted such an argument, but 
the Court took the trouble to analyze the dissent’s concern and re-
jected it once again.  In the Court’s view, the dissenters’ concern that 
speech would create demand for unnecessary treatments “amounts to 
 
427 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
428 Id. at 368. 
429 Id. at 369. 
430 Id. at 370. 
431 Id. at 372. 
432 Id. 
433 Id. at 371–72. 
434 Id. at 373 (discussing Justice Breyer’s dissent). 
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a fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful infor-
mation about compounded drugs.”435  The Court noted that this fear 
rests on the questionable assumption that doctors would prescribe 
unnecessary treatments simply because misguided patients asked for 
them.436  Even if that assumption were true, it still would not justify a 
ban on advertising:437 
[B]ans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech . . . usually 
rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irra-
tionally’ to the truth . . . . The First Amendment directs us to be especial-
ly skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what 
the government perceives to be their own good.438 
If the goal was to prevent inappropriate prescribing of compounded 
drugs, a proper solution might have been to regulate physicians’ bad 
prescribing practices rather than to ban speech.  Before it could ban 
speech, the FDA needed to show “why it would not also be appropri-
ate to rely on doctors to refrain from prescribing compounded drugs 
to patients who do not need them in a world where advertising was 
permitted.”439 
Very recently, Vermont attempted a speech-has-bad-consequences 
argument in Sorrell v. IMS Health and (not surprisingly) the Supreme 
Court rejected it.  The state argued that pharmaceutical detailing 
raises the costs of medical services by encouraging prescription of 
high-cost, on-patent drugs.440  The Court acknowledged that the 
state’s policy goals may be proper but its regulation did not advance 
them in a proper way.441  The state was attempting to reduce 
healthcare costs through the indirect means of restraining certain 
speech by certain speakers.442  The Court reiterated, “Those who seek 
to censor or burden free expression often assert that disfavored 
speech has adverse effects.  But the fear that people would make bad 
decisions if given truthful information cannot justify content-based 
burdens on speech.” 443 
Addressing concerns about mix-ups.  Of all the concerns that sur-
round the return of results, perhaps the most substantial one is the 
 
435 Id. at 374. 
436 Id. 
437 Id. at 375. 
438 Id. (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996)) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
439 Id. at 376. 
440 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct 2653, 2670 (2011). 
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443 Id. at 2670–71 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
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risk of potential mix-ups in which one person would receive another 
person’s test results.  When research procedures call for specimens to 
be used in de-identified form, there is little potential for such mix-ups 
to occur because de-identification renders it impossible to return re-
sults.  The potential for mix-ups arises, however, if a research labora-
tory uses specimens in an identifiable form (coded or fully identified) 
yet fails to maintain appropriate controls to ensure that specimens 
and test results consistently and reliably can be traced back to the 
identities of the specimen contributors.  Because CLIA requires rec-
ord-keeping and sample-control procedures, requiring CLIA certifi-
cation of labs that return results obviously could help reduce the 
chance of mix-ups.  Yet, even if the government may have a substan-
tial interest in averting mix-ups, and even if the CLIA regulation di-
rectly advances that interest, requiring CLIA certification is not the 
least restrictive means to advance the government’s interest.  CLIA-
certified laboratories are subject to many requirements that go far 
beyond what is necessary to avoid mix-ups. CLIA requires labs to un-
dergo periodic inspections (known as surveys) every two years to as-
sess compliance with an wide array of requirements addressing things 
like the qualifications of lab personnel; CLIA also requires quality 
control standards, proficiency testing, and quality assurance that go 
considerably beyond simply keeping good records and maintaining 
reliable sample-control procedures.444  A less restrictive way to avoid 
mix-ups would be simply to require appropriate record-keeping and 
sample-control procedures, without requiring all the other things 
that CLIA requires.  The notion that CLIA-certification is necessary in 
order to avoid mix-ups in the return of results fails at the final step of 
Central Hudson analysis:  it is not the least restrictive means to get the 
job done. 
Conclusion:  Recommended polices to suppress the return of results are 
more restrictive than the Constitution allows.  Even if it is true that return 
of results may have bad consequences, this does not justify banning 
the return of results.  Table 3 summarizes the constitutional status of 
the various bioethical justifications offered in Table 1. 
 
444 See SACGHS, 2008 REPORT, supra note 80, at 64 (briefly summarizing CLIA regulatory 
requirements). 
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TABLE 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF BIOETHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR 
RESTRICTING THE RETURN OF RESULTS 
CHALLENGES TO THE VALUE OF THE COMMUNICATION 
1. Individual findings are not “information” worth communicating.  These argu-
ments appear likely to fail at Step Two of Central Hudson analysis (no 
substantial governmental interest in suppressing low-worth communica-
tions that are not inherently misleading).  Policies to suppress the re-
turn of results that lack well-established clinical validity and utility ap-
pear particularly likely to fail at Step Two of the analysis.  Concerns 
about analytical validity may also be subject to challenge at Step Two 
but, if they survive Step Two, appear likely to fail at Steps Three–Four on 
the basis that suppressing speech is not the least restrictive means to ad-
dress uncertainty about the value of the information being returned. 
 
2. Returning results is ineffective:  even if participants are not harmed by it, they 
may fail to gain any benefits.  Such arguments fail at Step Two (no substan-
tial governmental interest in suppressing low-worth communications that 
are not inherently misleading). 
CONCERNS ABOUT LISTENER VULNERABILITY 
3. Returning results may expose participants to anxiety.  This argument fails at 
Step Two (no substantial governmental interest in preventing people 
from feeling anxiety in response to unpleasant factual statements). 
 
4. Participants may misunderstand their results.  Some courts reject this justifi-
cation at Step Two; other courts reject it at Steps Three–Four.  The gov-
ernment cannot ban speech that is not inherently misleading.  However, 
the government may be justified in requiring disclosure of the uncertain-
ty and limited clinical validity and utility of experimental genetic test re-
sults.  Another appropriate speech-preserving response would be for the 
government to ensure adequate services are available to help people un-
derstand their test results. 
 
5. Returning results may cause participants to make bad healthcare decisions that 
harm them.  This argument fails at Steps Three–Four. The proper re-
sponse is not to suppress speech but instead to regulate physicians and 
healthcare organizations to deter provision of unneeded and harmful 
health care. 
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6. Returning results exposes participants to the risk of stigmatization or discrimina-
tion.  This concern fails at Steps Three–Four.  Proper response is not to 
suppress communication of genetic test results but instead to pass laws 
such as the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act to tackle stigma-
tization and discrimination directly. 
 
7. Participants’ preferences to receive return of results may not reflect what they actu-
ally want.  This has not been litigated.  First Amendment doctrine accepts 
that listeners are the best parties to assess their own desire to partake of 
communication, and First Amendment law generally does not second-
guess them.  The exception would be if the listener meets criteria for de-
cisional incompetence under the law of the state where the communica-
tion takes place—a standard that few people who have been permitted to 
participate in genetic research would meet. 
CONCERNS ABOUT BROADER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HARMS TO THE PUBLIC 
8.  Returning results may cause participants to over-consume  follow-up healthcare 
services.  Arguments that “speech has bad consequences” generally fail at 
Steps Three–Four.  The proper response is not to suppress speech but to 
regulate physicians and healthcare organizations to deter provision of 
wasteful healthcare services. 
 
9. The cost of returning results may harm the research enterprise.  This is another 
“speech has bad consequences” argument that would fail at Steps Three–
Four.  Suppressing speech is neither a direct nor least-restrictive way to 
address the national challenge of financing biomedical research.  More-
over, the alleged high cost of returning results often reflects bioethicists’ 
assumption that researchers must fully validate research results before 
they return them.  Returning less-fully validated results with appropriate 
disclosure of the uncertainties would address the cost problem effectively 
without burdening free speech. 
 
10. Participants may corrupt genetic understanding as they attempt to decipher the 
meaning of their test results.  This argument implicates core First Amend-
ment speech.  It fails not as an intrusion on commercial speech, but as 
an intrusion on core First Amendment speech. 
E.  Is the Return of Results Regulable as Professional Speech? 
It is sometimes hard to draw a clean line between commercial 
speech and other forms of speech that the government is free to reg-
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ulate.445  One category of regulable speech—professional speech—
requires further discussion. 
Reasons for regulating professional speech.  Governmental bodies have 
considerable latitude to regulate the “professional speech” that physi-
cians, lawyers, and other licensed professionals communicate to their 
patients and clients in the course of professional practice activities.446  
This does not, however, imply that all “speech by a professional” can 
constitutionally be regulated; the “difference between professional 
speech and speech by a professional is constitutionally profound.”447  
To illustrate this point, Professor Post cites a case in which a state li-
censing board was able to discipline a dentist for advising his patients 
that amalgam fillings were poisonous—advice that, in the board’s 
view, was against the weight of scientific evidence.448  However, the 
board had to back off in the face of a First Amendment suit when it 
subsequently tried to discipline the dentist for publishing that same 
message in a newspaper editorial.449  The in-office advice to patients 
was regulable “professional speech” that could be sanctioned if it vio-
lated accepted professional standards.  The same advice published in 
a newspaper editorial was pure “speech by a professional”450 that mer-
ited the highest level of constitutional protection.  Thus, the precise 
parameters and context of a communication affect how much First 
Amendment protection it receives. 
The regulation of professional speech is justified, at least in part, 
by concerns about listener vulnerability.  The settings in which lay-
people meet with professionals may serve to make the listener vulner-
able—for example, seeking treatment for an illness, seeking account-
ing advice about a stressful tax audit, or consulting a lawyer because 
one is in jail or is being sued.  Moreover, it can be hard for a client or 
patient to evaluate claims made by licensed professionals who possess 
 
445 See Post, supra note 200, at 21 (noting the large number of cases in which the Supreme 
Court has addressed the distinction between commercial speech and fully protected pub-
lic discourse but a relative paucity of cases in which the Court has clarified the distinction 
between protected commercial speech and other forms of commercial communication 
that fall outside of First Amendment protection and can be regulated). 
446 See Halberstam, supra note 59, at 834–38 (discussing the scope of governmental authority 
to regulate physicians’ speech); see also Post, supra note 56, at 947–49 (discussing regula-
tion of professional speech by physicians and dentists). 
447 Post, supra note 56, at 949; see also Halberstam, supra note 59, at 843 (distinguishing 
speech “uttered in the course of professional practice” from speech “uttered by a profes-
sional”). 
448 Breiner v. State, No. CV 98061275, 1998 WL 738066, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 
1998). 
449 Post, supra note 56, at 948–49. 
450 Id. 
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superior knowledge in their fields.  Thus, a licensing body or other 
qualified group of professionals intervenes and defines the bounda-
ries of what licensed professionals may say. 
Problems with the view that return of results is practice of medicine.  Regu-
lating the return of results might be justified, from a legal point of 
view, if returning results were conceived as a form of professional 
speech.  The idea here is that returning results converts the research 
encounter into a clinical encounter, transforming research partici-
pants into patients and thrusting investigators into the practice of 
medicine.  The line between research and medical practice is in fact a 
blurry one that grows ever blurrier in the context of modern genomic 
medicine.451  Yet, there are conceptual problems in equating return of 
results with the practice of medicine and then citing this as the ra-
tionale for regulating investigators’ speech. 
One contradiction is that, under this theory, the return of results 
seemingly should be most heavily regulated in situations where results 
have high clinical or reproductive significance and actionability, and 
least regulated when the results are uncertain or lack clinical signifi-
cance.  When investigators return clinically significant, actionable re-
sults, the analogy between returning results and practicing medicine 
is at its zenith and the case for regulating the communication as 
“practice of medicine” is strongest.  When the results have little or no 
clinical significance (and assuming this fact has been properly dis-
closed), the participant is less like a patient and the communication 
bears little similarity to medical practice.  This implies that regulating 
the return of results is most justified when the results have high clini-
cal significance and least justified when they do not. 
Yet, this is directly at odds with the policies many bioethicists rec-
ommend.  As discussed earlier, a number of bioethical studies rec-
ommend not returning results that lack clinical utility or actionabil-
ity452 or that have uncertain medical or reproductive significance.453  
Under a professional speech analysis, speech regulation is least justi-
fied in such circumstances.  Discussing genes that have no current 
 
451 See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 37, at 444–45 (noting that return of results forces a rethinking of 
the traditional wall between research and clinical care); see also Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pil-
lars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm:  The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 476–85 (2010) (discussing 2007 amendments to the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act that envision ongoing research activities after drugs have made 
the transition into clinical care). 
452 See Wolf et al, supra note 42, at 230–31 tbl.3 (summarizing recommendations from various 
bioethical studies of the return of individual research results). 
453 Parker, supra note 20, at 452 (“It is generally, though not uniformly, agreed that unrelia-
ble results ought not be offered back to individuals.”). 
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medical significance is not the practice of medicine; it is more in the 
nature of a chat about the poorly developed state of genetic science:  
“You have this gene variant, and nobody really knows whether it af-
fects human health.”  Such remarks are better characterized as 
“speech by a professional” (assuming, of course, that the investigator 
even is a licensed medical professional) than “professional speech.”454  
Banning the return of results that lack clinical validity or utility can-
not be justified as regulation of professional speech because such 
speech bears little resemblance to the practice of medicine. 
Second, it would be odd indeed for the federal government to de-
fend its various restrictions on the return of results under the theory 
that these are valid regulations of the practice of medicine. These re-
strictions arise under the CLIA regulation455 and the Common Rule,456 
both regulations administered by agencies within HHS.  In other 
HHS regulatory contexts, such as FDA regulation of medical prod-
ucts, the federal government has scrupulously sought to avoid intrud-
ing on the states’ prerogative to regulate the practice of medicine.457  
There is little real doubt that the federal government could regulate 
aspects of medical practice if it desired to do so,458 but as a policy mat-
ter the FDA has gone to great lengths not to regulate the practice of 
medicine during the seventy-five years it has been regulating under 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938.  In light of that history, it 
seems almost inconceivable that HHS would assert that its restrictions 
 
454 Post, supra note 56, at 949. 
455 See discussion supra Part I.C (concerning restrictions applicable to CLIA-certified labora-
tories); see also discussion supra Part I.D (concerning restrictions on return of results by 
non-CLIA-certified labs under the CLIA research exception at 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2)). 
456 See discussion supra Part I.E (concerning restrictions under the Common Rule at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 46). 
457 See, e.g., Evans, supra note 451, at 500–02, 521–23 (tracing Congress’s careful avoidance, 
in the years between 1930 and the present, of federal intrusions into the practice of med-
icine in connection with federal regulation of medical products); see also David G. Adams, 
The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Health Care Professionals, in 2 
FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATIONS:  AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THERAPEUTIC 
PRODUCTS 423 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 1997) (“[T]he FDA has traditionally taken the 
position that it does not regulate the practice of medicine or pharmacy and has generally 
avoided regulatory actions that would directly restrict or interfere with professional ser-
vice to patients.”). 
458 See  Adams, supra note 457, at 424–25 (noting that courts have never found constitutional 
limits on the FDA’s power to regulate physicians); see also Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA 
Must Preempt Tort Litigation:  A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagare-
da, 1 J. TORT L. art. 5, at 7 (2006) (arguing that there is little doubt under modern law 
that Congress has ample power to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and use of 
drugs and medical devices and this reasoning encompasses genetic tests insofar as genetic 
tests are a form of medical device). 
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on the return of results are a valid federal regulation of medical 
speech. 
There is a third contradiction in the view that return of results in-
volves the type of “dependence or reliance”459 that justifies regulation 
of professional speech.  At the point when participants consent to 
participate in research, the Common Rule conceives them to be au-
tonomous and capable of making decisions in their own best inter-
ests.  If this were not true at the point when they consented, then it 
may have been unethical to allow them to participate in the research 
or, at least, it may have been appropriate to constrain their ability to 
consent as is done for various categories of vulnerable individuals 
under the regulations at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpts. B–D.460  Thus it can 
reasonably be presumed that any person who has been allowed to 
participate in genetics research possesses the attributes of individual 
autonomy.  Yet later, at the point when research participants request 
return of results, many bioethicists advocate restricting what they can 
be told.  As Professor Post points out, the urge to suppress consensual 
communications often presumes that the participants are vulnerable 
and incapable of acting in their own best interests.461  Yet, if they are 
too vulnerable to make autonomous decisions about the return of re-
sults from the research, then was it ethical to involve them in the re-
search at all? 
It is of course true that vulnerability is context-dependent, and a 
person may be autonomous in one situation while vulnerable in an-
other.  Consenting to participate in a study of genes associated with 
susceptibility to cancer may be different from consenting to be told 
that one may actually possess such a gene.  Yet, bioethicists trace a 
dubious line when they deem participants sufficiently autonomous to 
consent to research yet insufficiently autonomous to consent to re-
turn of results from that same research.  If, in fact, the participants 
are incapable of appreciating the meaning, limitations, and uncer-
tainty of the genetic tests used in the research, at the very least this 
casts doubt on whether they were adequately informed about the na-
ture of the research to which they so recently consented.  This is the 
inherent contradiction in policies that suppress the return of results 
to research participants for their own good:  such policies presume 
that the participants have made a transition from autonomy to vul-
 
459 Post, supra note 200, at 23. 
460 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201–46.409 (imposing special constraints on the informed content 
process when the prospective research participants are children, pregnant women, or 
prisoners). 
461 Post, supra note 200, at 23. 
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nerability which, if true, begs the question whether their continued 
participation in the research is ethically appropriate.  If the partici-
pants truly are confused about how uncertain experimental genetic 
tests actually are, then their consent to the research may have been 
tainted by misperceptions of its scientific value. 
This is not to deny that research participants may be vulnerable in 
the context of conversations that return research results.  However, to 
justify restricting investigators’ speech, bioethicists would need to ex-
plain more precisely how and why the participants became vulnerable 
and what this vulnerability implies for other aspects of research where 
they were presumed to be autonomous. 
Conclusion:  Return of results is not regulable as professional speech.  Ar-
guing that restrictions on the return of results are justified as a regu-
lation of professional speech raises more questions than it resolves.  
An enduring concern in bioethics is that research participants may 
labor under a therapeutic misconception that causes them to confuse 
research with medical practice.  Yet, when bioethicists attempt to jus-
tify regulating the return of results because of its alleged similarity to 
professional speech, it is the bioethicists rather than the research par-
ticipants who fall prey to the therapeutic misconception.  Return of 
results is not the practice of medicine despite some overlap of the 
topics discussed.  HHS agencies that restrict the return of results 
seem poorly positioned to assert otherwise.  If HHS truly believed 
that returning results amounts to the practice of medicine, its tradi-
tional posture on federalism seemingly would require HHS agencies 
to step aside and let state medical practice boards regulate this 
speech. 
V.  SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH CLIA RESTRICTIONS ON THE RETURN OF 
RESULTS 
The CLIA regulation exemplifies the First Amendment problems 
that arise in connection with suppression of genomic speech.  As not-
ed earlier, HHS already has initiated a rulemaking that will facilitate 
direct reporting of test results from CLIA-certified clinical laborato-
ries that are subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.462  HHS based this ac-
tion on concern about patients’ rights463 while also noting that “the 
advent of certain health reform concepts (for example, individual-
 
462 See discussion supra Part I.C (citing CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 
52, at 56, 717). 
463 See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 52, at 56,714 (citing a need to in-
crease direct patient access rights). 
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ized medicine and an individual’s active involvement in his or her 
own health care) would be best served by revisiting CLIA limitations 
on the disclosure of laboratory test results.”464  Even if this initiative 
proceeds to a final rule, however, it will only improve access to genet-
ic test results in situations where the test subject is dealing with an en-
tity covered by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  Moreover, this rulemaking 
initiative does nothing to address the return of results from non-
CLIA-certified research laboratories.  The CLIA research exception at 
42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) continues to be perceived as a major barrier 
to the return of research results.465 
The CLIA research exception places regulatory burdens on re-
search laboratories (by requiring them to seek CLIA certification) if 
they “report patient specific results for the diagnosis, prevention, or 
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the 
health of individual patients.”466  Administrative law judges who work 
with CLIA sometimes summarize this condition by saying that CLIA 
certification is required if a lab “perform[s] clinical diagnostic tests 
on human specimens.”467  Phrased this way, it seems clear that return-
ing results should not give rise to an obligation for a research lab to 
seek CLIA certification because, quite obviously, an experimental ge-
netic test is not the same thing as a clinical diagnostic test. 
Yet, in practice, this is not very clear.  The research exception is so 
vague that people of ordinary intelligence cannot assess which types 
of speech it prohibits.468  In particular, the research community is un-
sure whether returning individual research results to participants may 
trigger CLIA’s certification requirements.469  Can an experimental 
genetic test that has no known clinical validity and utility be consid-
ered a test for “diagnosis, prevention, treatment . . . or assessment of 
health?”  One would think not.  Yet, CLIA regularly allows LDTs that 
have poorly validated clinical validity and utility to be used in clinical 
care,470 so the lack of clinical significance does not necessarily exclude 
an experimental test from being “clinical.”  At the other extreme, 
suppose an experimental test does have clinical validity and utility.  
Does this fact transform it into a “clinical diagnostic test[]”471 that, if 
 
464 Id. at 56,713. 
465 See discussion supra Part I.D. 
466 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (2012). 
467 See, e.g., In re Blanding Urgent Care Ctr. Lab. v. Health Care Fin. Admin., No. CR438, 
1996 WL 600630, at *8 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Sept. 30, 1996). 
468 See discussion supra Part I.D. 
469 Id. 
470 See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
471 Blanding, 1996 WL 600630, at *8. 
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reported to the research participant, triggers the need for CLIA certi-
fication?  The most sensible answer to this question appears to be no.  
The CLIA regulation has severed the concept of a clinical diagnostic 
test from the concept of a test that has well-established clinical validity 
and utility.  The regulation does not condition the “clinical” status of 
a test upon a scientific evidentiary standard that requires proof of 
clinical validity and utility.  If LDTs that lack clinical validity can be 
sold as clinical diagnostic tests,472 the flipside seemingly should be that 
experimental tests do not become clinical tests merely by token of 
having clinical validity and utility.  But, can an investigator be sure? 
Whether returning a test result triggers CLIA’s certification re-
quirements simply cannot be inferred from the scientific attributes of 
the test.  The regulation provides no guidance on other factors that 
may bear on this determination—for example, the subjective intent 
of the speaker, the listener’s actual use of the information, and so 
forth.473  Given the vagueness of this regulation, scientific investigators 
working in non-CLIA-certified research laboratories are understand-
ably hesitant to return results, especially in light of the following: 
Any person who intentionally violates any requirement [of the CLIA reg-
ulation] shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined under 
title 18, or both, except that if the conviction is for a second or subse-
quent violation of such requirement such person shall be imprisoned for 
not more than 3 years or fined in accordance with title 18, or both.474 
Perhaps it displays the advancement of our post-genomic civilization 
that CLIA only threatens jail time for investigators who inappropri-
ately let laypeople read the Book of Life, whereas Tyndale was put to 
death.  The possibility of criminal penalties for violating CLIA’s re-
search exception amplifies the constitutional problem with its vague-
ness.  The standard of clarity required in criminal statutes is far more 
demanding than in statutes that only carry civil penalties.475  “It would 
be unthinkable to incarcerate someone for violating a law which she 
could not possibly understand.”476 
 
472 See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
473 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
474 Public Health Service Act § 353(l), 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a(l) (2006); see also 42 C.F.R. 
§ 493.1806(e)(1994) (“Under section 353(l) of the PHS Act, an individual who is convict-
ed of intentionally violating any CLIA requirement may be imprisoned or fined.”). 
475 See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982) 
(discussing the Court’s greater tolerance of vagueness in civil, as opposed to criminal, 
statutes). 
476 Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. Lungren (Lungren I), 809 F. Supp. 747, 761 (N.D. Cal., 1992) 
(citing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
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Suppose an investigator spots a gene mutation that suggests that a 
research participant needs to report to her doctor immediately for a 
colonoscopy to address the risk of colon cancer.  Unfortunately, the 
genetic test was performed in a research laboratory that lacks CLIA 
certification, and the investigator is worried it may violate CLIA’s re-
search exception to disclose the test result to the research partici-
pant.  CLIA confronts this investigator with the possibility—at least in 
theory—of going to jail for sharing potentially life-saving information 
with the research participant.  It is true that criminal law recognizes a 
privilege for people to violate criminal statutes when necessary to save 
a third party from death or serious bodily injury.  The investigator 
seemingly would be entitled to claim this privilege as a defense.  But, 
is it constitutional for CLIA to place investigators in the position of 
having to make such choices? 
HHS cannot skirt this constitutional problem by arguing that the 
agency does not, in practice, apply CLIA’s criminal penalties to inves-
tigators who return research results.  The Supreme Court has made it 
very clear that “[w]ell-intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards 
do not neutralize the vice of a vague law.”477  In a First Amendment 
challenge to a California statute that envisioned criminal penalties 
for manufacturers who make inappropriate environmental claims 
about their products, the state argued that its “traditional office poli-
cy” was to handle violations civilly rather than criminally.478  The court 
retorted, “This will not do”479 and proceeded to rule that the statute’s 
definition of the term “recyclable” was unconstitutionally vague.480  In 
the same way, even if HHS has no plans to impose criminal penalties 
for violation of CLIA’s vague research exception, this will not do; 
there still is a constitutional problem. 
Vague laws pose constitutional problems even when they carry no 
threat of criminal prosecution.  There is a general principle that laws 
must be definite to be valid.481  Vague laws leave individuals unsure 
which activities are prohibited and leave regulators without explicit 
standards to guide consistent, fair enforcement.482  “[W]hen a law 
regulates conduct protected by the First Amendment, the vagueness 
 
477 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964). 
478 Lungren I, 809 F. Supp. at 761 n.14. 
479 Id.; see also Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. Lungren (Lungren II), 44 F.3d 726, 728 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (noting, in the appeal of Lungren I, that the state chose not to appeal the Dis-
trict Court’s ruling that the definition of “recyclable” was unconstitutionally vague). 
480 Lungren I, 809 F. Supp. at 762. 
481 GEORGE BLUM ET AL., AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 972 (2013) (discussing definiteness 
or vagueness of laws, regulations, and orders). 
482 Id. 
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doctrine demands an even ‘greater degree of specificity than in other 
contexts’”483 and laws can be set aside if they are too vague.  Courts 
traditionally apply this concept in a “watered down” manner when 
the speech in question is only commercial speech.484  As the Supreme 
Court mused in Central Hudson, commercial speech is a “hardy breed 
of expression” driven by speakers’ economic self-interests and, as 
such, it is “not particularly susceptible to being crushed.”485  Based on 
this reasoning, courts often are willing to tolerate a bit more vague-
ness in laws that regulate commercial speech than they would tolerate 
in laws that regulate pure speech.486 
Several factors suggest that courts would not be willing to tolerate 
the level of vagueness apparent in CLIA’s research exception.  Al-
though the speech in question—return of results—may qualify as 
commercial speech, it is not driven by the speaker’s economic self-
interests in the way that commercial speech usually is.  Investigators 
return results gratis and, indeed, they do so at a perceived risk of hav-
ing their federal research grants suspended if an IRB decides their 
speech was unethical (whatever that means).  Economic self-interest 
does not favor this speech; rather, it reinforces the pressure not to 
speak.  Return of results is not the “hardy breed of expression” for 
which courts have been willing to apply a relaxed vagueness doctrine.  
Moreover, the return of results includes some expressive (pure 
speech) elements that may warrant stronger protection than mere 
commercial speech.  This Article deliberately blinded itself to those 
expressive elements as a matter of rigorous study design, but they un-
deniably are present and may call for application of a less-relaxed 
vagueness doctrine.  Finally, the potential for criminal penalties un-
der the CLIA regulation argues against a relaxed attitude about the 
research exception’s vagueness. 
The Supreme Court mandates that a “statute, of course, is to be 
construed, if such a construction is fairly possible, to avoid raising 
 
483 Lungren I, 809 F. Supp. at 759 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)). 
484 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 6:12 (2013). 
485 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) 
(quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (discussing why overbroad regulations are less threatening to commercial 
speech than to pure speech). 
486 See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 1 n.9 (1979) (“When dealing with restrictions on 
commercial speech we frame our decisions narrowly, allowing modes of regula-
tion . . . that might otherwise be impermissible within the realm of personal expression.” 
(citation omitted)); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 498 (1982) (articulating a relaxed vagueness test in a commercial speech context). 
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doubts of its constitutionality.”487  There are, to say the very least, 
doubts about whether it is constitutional for HHS to construe CLIA’s 
research exception in a way that bans the return of individual results 
from genetic research.488  CLIA’s research exception must therefore 
be construed in a way that removes these doubts.  It appears likely 
that courts would do so if the question were put before them.  It is to 
be hoped that HHS will take the initiative and fix this problem with-
out putting investigators and research participants to the expense of 
petitioning federal courts to order HHS to do so.  If HHS fails to act, 
then court challenges are in order.  HHS should clarify that the CLIA 
research exception does not ban the return of genetic test results to 
research participants who have expressed the desire to learn their re-
sults.  This is not merely an ethical imperative; it is a constitutional 
imperative. 
CONCLUSION 
Many layers of state and federal laws limit investigators’ freedom 
to communicate with willing participants who request the return of 
results.  To assess the constitutionality of these laws, each of them ul-
timately will require a separate, evidence-based analysis of the gov-
ernment’s asserted interests and whether the regulation advances 
them directly and without unnecessary burdens on speech.  This Arti-
cle has surveyed relevant themes in First Amendment law drawn from 
cases that addressed questions similar to those that arise in the con-
text of return of results.  These cases suggest that laws and regulations 
that restrict the return of results are vulnerable to First Amendment 
challenges.  This Article has not, however, mounted an evidence-
based challenge to specific laws.  The duty to produce evidence lies 
with those who champion speech restrictions, not on those who ques-
tion them.  It is long past time for the bioethics community and poli-
cymakers to produce credible evidence that the harms they conjec-
ture are real; that the government’s interests in addressing these 
harms are of a sort that courts, in actual cases, have treated as sub-
stantial; that suppressing the speech of research investigators directly 
advances those interests; and that no less extensive burden on speech 
will work.  If—as looks probable—no such evidence exists, then the 
bioethics community, with all due respect, needs to retire from the 
 
487 St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780 (1981). 
488 See discussion supra Parts III, IV. 
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business of suppressing investigators’ constitutionally protected 
speech. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
